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Abstract
The housing boom of the mid 2000s proved to be unsustainable, and led to the
Great Recession of 2007-2009 – the worst economic collapse in the United States
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. This dissertation empirically assesses
some of the main explanations for the severity of the housing boom and bust.
In the first chapter, “Employment in the Great Recession: How Important
were Household Credit Supply Shocks?,” I pool data from all large multimarket
lenders in the U.S. to estimate how many of the seven million jobs lost in
the Great Recession can be explained by reductions in the supply of mortgage
credit. I construct a mortgage credit supply instrument at the county level,
as the weighted average (by prerecession mortgage market shares) of liquidity-
driven lender shocks during the recession. I find that the reduction in mortgage
supply could explain about 15 percent of the employment decline. The job
losses are concentrated in construction and finance.
In the second chapter, “Property Investors and the Housing Boom and
Bust,” I use new cross-sectional housing data to argue that property invest-
ment – existing homeowners acquiring additional properties – was a central
driver of boom-bust dynamics over the recent housing cycle. Measuring in-
vestor activity at the county level as the fraction of mortgage originations for
non-owner-occupied housing, I find that ‘investor’ counties with high amenity
values (warm winters, waterfronts) had high investor activity both before the
2000s and in the peak boom years. In counties with high investor shares in 1998-
2000, home prices and employment grew faster in 2003-2006 than elsewhere, and
crashed harder in 2007-2010. My estimate is that investor activity could explain
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30 percent of the total variation in construction and financial employment over
2003-2010.
High savings in emerging economies may have helped fuel the U.S. housing
boom. To shed light on why rapidly urbanizing high growth countries such
as China are capital exporters, the third chapter “Can Risky Rural-Urban
Migration Help Explain the Flow of Capital from Developing to Advanced
Economies?” models the saving motives of residents in a country undergoing
rapid urbanization characterized by circular migration, a feature of many de-
veloping nations. Migrants move back and forth between rural-urban areas as
determined by transition probabilities calibrated to match migration flows and
the pace of urbanization in China. Workers accumulate savings in the high-
productivity urban sector because of the risk of returning to the low-wage rural
sector. As the urban population increases, so do aggregate savings and income.
Advisors: Christopher D. Carroll, Jon Faust, Jonathan Wright
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Chapter 1
Employment in the Great




Employment fell by over 7 million in the Great Recession. Possible explana-
tions include declines in credit supply (Eggertsson and Krugman 2012; Guerri-
eri and Lorenzoni 2011), household net worth (Mian and Sufi 2014; Giroud and
Mueller 2015), and increases in uncertainty (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2015;
Bloom 2014). The goal of this paper is to isolate and empirically assess the
credit supply hypothesis: to what extent did reductions in credit supply play
a causal and independent role in explaining the job losses that occurred in the
period 2007-2010? To do so, I measure plausibly exogenous variation in credit
supply (specifically for mortgages) at the county level, based on the interaction
of prerecession county-lender market shares, which measure the importance of
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each lender to each locality immediately prior to the recession, and heteroge-
neous aggregate lender shocks during the recession. The county level estimates
show that the reduction in mortgage supply negatively affected the health of
residential markets, leading to declines in home buying, home prices, and em-
ployment in the construction sector; in other industries less directly linked to
real estate, the job losses were much more muted and close to zero. A partial
equilibrium aggregation exercise suggests that the decline in mortgage supply
could explain close to 15 percent of the total job losses during the recession, or
about 1 million of the total jobs lost.
The starting point of this paper is the observation that there is a strong OLS
association between declines in local employment and mortgage credit issuance
during the recession. This suggests that reductions in mortgage supply could
have played an important role in driving the job losses. On the other hand, the
OLS association could be entirely driven by reverse causality – declines in local
employment and economic activity could have led to the decline in mortgage
issuance. To isolate the effects of reductions in mortgage supply on economic
activity, I construct a mortgage credit supply instrument at the county level.
The identification strategy exploits the well-known fact in the mortgage liter-
ature (discussed and further documented in the paper) that credit relationships
in the mortgage market – as in the corporate market – are persistent and not
easily substitutable.1 Therefore, an exogenous lender shock to a locality is not
1Market shares at the county-lender level are highly persistent year on year; for example,
2005 county-lender shares explain 2007 shares almost 1-for-1. In the recession, there were few
cases of lender entry into new localities: of 2008-2010 county-lender pairs, less than 8 percent
were new. Even in ‘normal’ times there is limited shopping, with Alexandrov and Koulayev
(2017), Woodward and Hall (2012) and Lacko and Pappalardo (2010) finding that borrowers
shop too little despite significant price dispersion.
2
immediately offset by new lender entry.
The instrument measures the average supply response of a county’s tradi-
tional lenders during the recession for ‘nonlocal reasons’ – reasons unrelated
to the condition of local economies. The instrument is based on two sources
of variation: (i) the heterogenous aggregate supply response of lenders during
the recession, and (ii) variation in the reliance of localities to different lenders
prior to the recession (measured with 2005-2007 market shares). To measure
(i) aggregate differences in lender supply, I estimate lender fixed effects explain-
ing variation in credit changes at the county-lender level during the recession,
while holding constant local economic conditions (via county fixed effects). The
lender fixed effects estimates are highly robust to alternative specifications, such
as controlling for census tract fixed effects or loan characteristics varying at the
county-lender level.2 County-lender market shares (ii) come straight from the
main data source, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. The county level credit
supply instrument is the weighted average (by 2005-2007 market shares) of the
lender fixed effects.
This paper is the first to construct a Bartik-style instrument based on the
interaction of heterogeneous aggregate lender shocks and local market shares
in the mortgage market during the recession. Working in parallel, Mondragon
(2018) also studies the employment effects of household credit shocks during
the recession, though his main instrument is based on county exposure to a
single troubled lender during the recession (discussed shortly). My approach
2Specifically, I regress credit changes at the county-lender level over 2007-2010 on county
fixed effects and lender fixed effects in the baseline specification. The lender fixed effects are
highly correlated (close to 1) when controlling instead for census tract fixed effects, using only
high-income or low-income loans, and controlling for variation in precrisis county-lender loan
characteristics.
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instead pools data from essentially all large multimarket lenders in the U.S.,
and follows in the tradition of recent related work studying the employment
effects of reductions in corporate credit supply via Bartik-style instruments,
such as Chodorow-Reich (2014), Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2015), and
Amiti and Weinstein (2018). The main contribution of this paper is the focus
on mortgage supply during the crisis, which may be particularly important,
since mortgages are the largest category of private credit, and funding markets
for mortgages were severely disrupted during the crisis. Notably, the private
secondary market for mortgages fully collapsed at the onset of the crisis and
remained inactive throughout. In line with previous research documenting that
low liquidity contributed to lower credit issuance during the crisis (Ivashina and
Scharfstein 2010; Cornett et al. 2011; Irani and Meisenzahl 2015), I document
that mortgage lenders were more likely to cut supply if they relied on funding
sources that proved fragile in the crisis. In particular, the reliance of banks on
wholesale debt, loan sales in the secondary market, and especially loan sales to
private buyers, explains 72 percent of the variation in lender supply during the
recession (the lender fixed effects).
The 2SLS results controlling for a detailed set of county observables and
region fixed effects are as follows. Declines in mortgage supply negatively af-
fected the health of residential markets. For example, a supply-driven plausibly
exogenous 10 percent decline in local mortgage issuance led to a 10 percent
decline in new residential permits and a 5 percent decline in home prices. Ar-
eas with larger declines in mortgage supply also experienced higher default and
foreclosure rates. The next question is whether the negative shock to real estate
spilled over into local labor markets, both in directly related industries such as
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construction and in other industries.
The employment effects are largely direct and concentrated in construction
and finance, a category of employment where about a third of workers are real
estate intermediaries.3 The main mechanism is that declines in mortgage supply
reduce demand for housing, which contributes to job losses in industries reliant
on housing demand. As evidence, I find that, for a given decline in mortgage
credit, job losses in construction are larger in counties where housing supply
is more elastic – areas where construction is more responsive to changes in
housing demand. The estimated effects on other categories of employment –
total private employment excluding construction and finance, and nontradable
employment – are close to zero and not significant. The 2SLS estimates on these
broad employment categories contrast with their OLS counterparts, which are
2-3 times larger and highly significant, suggesting the OLS estimates are biased
upward due to reverse causality.
Overall, a 10 percent exogenous decline in local mortgage credit leads to a
1 percent decline in total private employment. To gain a sense of the aggregate
implications of the county-level estimates, I perform a partial equilibrium ag-
gregation exercise that exploits the in-sample distribution of the credit supply
instrument, similar to the approaches in Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Mian and
Sufi (2014). The exercise suggests reductions in supply could explain close to
15 percent of the total jobs lost, or about 1.1 million jobs. The bottom line is
that the reduction in mortgage supply likely aggravated the fall in employment
to a meaningful, but moderate, extent.
3Construction and finance accounted for close to 35 percent of the job losses in the reces-
sion. Typically, their share in total employment is between 10-15 percent.
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The main concern regarding instrument validity is that lender location might
be correlated with unobserved local characteristics associated with job losses
during the recession. Identification requires that below-average suppliers were
not systematically sorted into localities experiencing below-average (or above-
average) employment shocks. To the extent that counties and lenders are
matched along observables, controlling for those characteristics isolates the re-
maining ‘as good as random’ variation in lender location. To that end, I control
for a highly detailed set of local characteristics that explain about 60 percent of
the variation in mortgage credit issuance across localities during the recession,
including the share of subprime borrowers, the run-up in home prices during
the boom, and various other demographic, housing, and industry characteris-
tics. It is not possible to control for everything that may be relevant, however,
and so I also rule out specific hypotheses about non-random lender location.
For example, risky lenders may have moved to risky localities during the boom
years. However, measuring the exposure of lenders to localities using 2000-2002
(instead of 2005-2007) market shares yields very similar results – the first stage
is weaker due to the loss in precision, but 2SLS point estimates are not statis-
tically different. I also show that results are very similar when using region,
division, or state fixed effects – this rules out hypotheses such as the possibility
that weak suppliers in the recession were more heavily concentrated in the Sand
States.4
This paper is part of the literature exploring the extent to which credit
shocks explain the fall in employment in the Great Recession. Most empirical
4The results are robust to a number of checks including ‘placebo’ tests; controlling for the
decline in small business lending in the recession; and the inclusion of large failed lenders
(e.g., IndyMac) in the analysis.
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work focuses on the employment effects of corporate credit shocks.5 Chodorow-
Reich (2014) estimates that credit shocks explain between one-third and one-
half of job losses at firms borrowing in the syndicated loan market. Greenstone,
Mas, and Nguyen (2015) find that credit shocks to small business loans help
explain declines in borrowing, but produce only small employment effects. The
credit supply variation I measure is specific to mortgages because county-lender
market shares for mortgages and small business loans are largely uncorrelated –
in other words, the mortgage lenders to one locality are often not the same as the
small business loan lenders. The results in the paper are robust to controlling
for declines in small business loans.
The most closely related paper is Mondragon (2018), whose credit supply
instrument is exposure to Wachovia Bank, a troubled lender in the recession.
He estimates that a 10 percent decline in instrumented mortgage credit leads
to a 3 percent decline in employment, an elasticity two times as large as the
OLS counterpart, and three times as large as my own estimate. One concern
is potential ‘bad’ bank in a ‘bad’ region matching – Wachovia had a larger
presence in states in the South Atlantic (e.g., FL, SC, NC) where job losses were
among the worst in the country. His estimates would have an upward bias if
employment shocks and Wachovia location have correlated spatial fixed effects.
In fact, when using division or state fixed effects, the Wachovia instrument
significantly weakens. In contrast, my paper pools information from all large
lenders located across the U.S. and employs a richer set of county controls,
and so is more robust to potential concerns about non-random county-lender
5A related empirical literature studies the international transmission of the financial crisis
through the banking sector (Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011); Haas and Lelyveld (2014); Schnabl
(2012)).
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matching. For example, the 2SLS point estimates in this paper are essentially
the same (not statistically different) when using region, division, or state fixed
effects.
The paper is also related to the work of Mian and Sufi (2014), Mian, Rao, and
Sufi (2013), Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2017), and others, on the household
net worth channel, which assesses the hypothesis that declines in household net
worth led to declines in aggregate demand and employment. The credit supply
and household net worth channels are related – for example, the bursting of the
housing boom helped precipitate the financial crisis. However, the run-up in
house prices does not explain all of the ensuing economic decline. To isolate the
credit supply channel, this paper asks: holding house prices constant, what were
the employment effects of reductions in mortgage supply during the recession?
I therefore condition on house price changes during the boom years, as well
as various prerecession characteristics of localities associated with the housing
boom and bust.
More broadly, this paper is part of the literature studying the effects of
changes in mortgage supply on housing and labor markets. Most empirical
work has focused on the former. Related work includes Favara and Imbs (2015);
Mian and Sufi (2011); Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2012); Berrospide, Black,
and Keeton (2016); Glancy (2015); Anenberg et al. (2016); Vojtech, Kay, and
Driscoll (2016); Gropp, Krainer, and Laderman (2014); Gete and Reher (2016);
Haltenhof, Jung Lee, and Stebunovs (2014); Chen, Hanson, and Stein (2017).
Only a handful of papers focus on the employment effects of reductions in mort-
gage supply. In the boom years, DiMaggio and Kermani (2014) use a federal
preemption of national banks from local anti-predatory lending laws in 2004
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to estimate the elasticity of nontradable employment with respect to mortgage
supply. In the bust, Passmore and Sherlund (2016) find that counties more
reliant on GSEs for mortgage credit experienced healthier labor markets in the
Great Recession. I contribute to this literature by highlighting the heteroge-
neous industry effects of mortgage supply shocks on construction and financial
employment.
1.2 Data Sources
I assemble a detailed county-level dataset including home prices, home sales,
employment, mortgage credit, credit scores, demographics, borrower character-
istics, industry composition, and various other local characteristics. The main
source for mortgage data is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Mort-
gage lenders with offices in metropolitan areas are required to publicly disclose
detailed information each year, including the dollar amount and number of
mortgages issued, as well as the location (census tract, county) of the prop-
erty securing the loan. Throughout the mid to late 2000s, HMDA covered over
90% of residential mortgage lending by dollar amount (Dell1Ariccia, Igan, and
Laeven 2012). I use mortgages for home purchase and improvement as the main
measure (loan purpose 1 and 2 in HMDA). Figure 1.1 plots aggregate trends
in mortgage originations, total private employment, and the S&P Case-Schiller
U.S. National Home Price Index, with the series indexed to their 2006 value.
Data on delinquency rates, foreclosure rates, home sales, and home prices
are obtained from CoreLogic. Data on building permits comes from the Census.
For employment, I rely on two sources, both of which are establishment-based
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and provide nearly full coverage of private employment: the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages (QCEW), and the County Business Patterns (CBP).
I use the CBP to measure tradable and nontradable employment using the
definitions in Mian and Sufi (2014), and the QCEW for the other employment
data.
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for over 1,000 of the largest counties
in the U.S. Each of these localities had over 15,000 households in the 2000
Decennial Census and account for almost 85% of aggregate employment. Table
1.3 provides definitions and sources for the data used throughout the paper.
While mortgage credit declined over 2007-2010 in virtually all counties, there
is significant cross-sectional variation in the decline, with credit falling by more
than 51% in ten percent of the counties in the sample and falling by less than
21% in the top decile. Figure 1.2 shows there is a strong positive OLS association
between declines in mortgage credit issuance and declines in both home prices
and employment. This suggests that declines in mortgage issuance could have
driven employment losses. On the other hand, the relationship might be entirely
explained by reverse causality – declines in local economic activity could have
driven the decline in employment and credit issuance.
I obtain lender-level data from HMDA, which provides loans by lender sub-
sidiaries (respondents) and locality. I match subsidiaries belonging to the same
parent company using the crosswalk maintained by Robert Avery, and aggre-
gate to the level of the parent company (bank holding company, for banking
institutions).6 To calculate changes in lending at the lender level without in-
cluding changes due to acquisitions, I use the standard approach (Bernanke and
6Available upon request at Robert.Avery@fhfa.gov
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Lown 1991; Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen 2015) of treating the acquired and
acquiring institutions as part of the same entity throughout the sample period,
which in this paper is over 2000-2010. I also conservatively drop failed insti-
tutions for most of the paper, because the extent to which their credit decline
was supply- or demand-driven cannot be credibly estimated. Dropping these
institutions is a conservative choice: it reduces the potential for biased estimates
at the expense of statistical power. I show, however, that including the failed
lenders, by assuming all of their credit decline was supply-driven and nonlocal,
increases the explanatory power of the credit supply instrument, while leaving
coefficient estimates in the second-stage essentially unchanged.
In measuring the exposure of counties to lenders, I focus on large multimar-
ket lenders operating in multiple counties who did not file for bankruptcy during
the crisis. Specifically, I include lenders operating in at least 100 counties in
2007, and who issued over $1 billion in mortgage originations in the same year.
Table 1.2 gives a summary of lender-level statistics. The 56 lenders account for
75 percent of mortgage lending over 2005-2007, so they cover the majority of
lending by market share, even though there were over 6,000 mortgage lenders
in that period. I roll up the remaining small institutions into a single entity.
1.3 Differences in Lender Supply
There were substantial differences in supply across lenders during the recession.
Some lenders almost fully halted originations, while a few even expanded. For
example, mortgage originations fell by 69 percent at Citibank but increased
by 17 percent at US Bank (Table 1.2). The empirical challenge, a variant of
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the reflection problem in Manski (1993), is that those differences could reflect
borrower characteristics rather than differences in lender supply. For exam-
ple, it is possible that US Bank’s typical customers experienced above-average
credit demand during the recession. The main empirical strategy is to estimate
lender fixed effects explaining variation in credit changes during the recession,
while holding various characteristics of loans constant including the location of
the property via locality fixed effects; other work employing similar methods
includes Khwaja and Mian (2008), Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2015), and
Amiti and Weinstein (2018). This strategy exploits the richness in the HMDA
data which provides originations at the locality-lender level and includes various
loan characteristics.
The lender fixed effects reveal substantial differences in aggregate supply
across lenders. They are largely driven by differences in lenders’ funding strat-
egy: reliance on funding sources that proved fragile in the crisis, such as whole-
sale debt and private loan sales in the secondary market, explain close to 75
percent of the variation in lender supply. In contrast, credit growth in the boom
years (2003-2006) does not help explain either differences in lender supply or
credit growth over 2007-2010, as shown in Figure 1.3. Therefore, I interpret
the supply differences as largely reflecting exposure to unexpected funding cost
shocks during the recession.
Specifically, I estimate versions of the following linear model that specifies
credit changes during the recession as a function of lender fixed effects, locality
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fixed effects, and lender-locality interaction effects:7
∆Li,b  αi   φb   γDi,b   υi,b (1.1)
where ∆Li,b are percent changes in mortgage credit originations at the county-
lender level over 2007-2010; αi are locality fixed effects (county or census-tract);
φb are lender fixed effects; and Di,b are prerecession county-lender characteris-
tics. The parameters of interest are those associated with the vector of lender
fixed effects φb, which capture the idiosyncratic lender factor common across
localities explaining variation in credit changes, net of locality fixed effects and
prerecession county-lender characteristics.
The model captures many of the reasons for variation in credit changes at
the lender-locality level during the Great Recession. For example, if originations
to a locality declined sharply because of deteriorating local economic conditions
– declines in local productivity, house prices, or credit scores – that will be
captured by the locality fixed effects αi. Similarly, if originations decline because
it is difficult for lenders to fund new mortgages, that would be captured in
the lender fixed effects φb. It is also possible that the variation is driven by
interaction effects Di,b – for instance, Citibank’s traditional borrowers could
have tended to experience below-average credit demand shocks, even within
localities.
In the baseline specification, I control only for county fixed effects. In this
case the identifying assumption is that within-county credit demand shocks are
uncorrelated with lender shocks. For example, supply contractions for Citibank
7The lender fixed effects are estimated using 30,161 county-lender observations, for the
56 lenders in the sample, and for county-lender pairs where the dollar value of originations
is larger than $1 million. The lender fixed effects explain about a fifth of the variation in
within-county lending changes over 2007-2010.
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would be overestimated if their borrowers tend to be low-income, and low-
income borrowers experienced worse credit demand shocks than average, even
within-counties. To address this possibility, I estimate equation 1.1 using only
high income loans, but estimates are very similar. Specifically, I estimate equa-
tion 1.1 using only loans to borrowers with income over $70,000 the median
income of borrowers in 2007. The correlation coefficient between the lender
fixed effects estimates in the baseline and the specification with only high in-
come loans is 0.96; see Figure 1.4. When using only low-income loans (borrower
income below $70,000), the correlation coefficient is also high, 0.92.
I also estimate equation 1.1 using census tract fixed effects rather than
county fixed effects. Census tracts are statistical subdivisions of counties, each
generally having a population size between 1,200 and 8,000 people. Census
tracts are smaller and are more homogeneous than counties.8 The lender fixed
effects estimates when using census tract fixed effects are also highly correlated
with the baseline (0.91). This shows that using a more detailed local control
for changes in credit demand has very little bearing on the lender fixed effects
estimates. Another alternative is to directly control for differences in the pre-
recession profile of borrowers and lenders via county-lender characteristics Di,b.
The county-lender characteristics observed in HMDA are borrower income, frac-
tion of loans classified as being high-risk, race, type of loan (owner-occupier),
and credit growth in the peak boom years 2003-2006 by county-lender. When
including Di,b in equation 1.1, the lender fixed effects estimates are again highly
8I rank census tracts within a county by borrower income, and divide the census tracts into
four equal-sized groups by income, i.e. the top quartile consists of the high-income census
tracts in the county. Census tract-income groups are more homogeneous than the county
– in 2007, the median within-group standard deviation of HMDA borrowers in the census
tract-income groups was $92 thousand, 27% lower than in counties.
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correlated.
Table 1.4 shows sample statistics for a selected sample (by size) of 30 of the
56 lenders used in the paper. Column 2 provides percent changes in national
mortgage originations over 2007-2010. Column 4 ranks lenders by the lender
fixed effects estimates; above-average lender fixed effects indicate above-average
supply. Changes in the ranking (going from Column 3 to 4) indicate differences
in the degree to which national changes in mortgage originations were driven
by geographic variation in exposure to credit demand shocks. For example, the
drop in Bank of the West’s ranking from 6th to 15th (from Column 1 to Column
2) indicates that lending changes for this bank remained relatively robust in the
recession partly because of its exposure to above-average geographies (in this
case the Midwest). Conversely, the improvement in the ranking of JPMorgan
Chase from 50th to 41th indicates that part of its national decline in originations
was driven by exposure to underperforming areas.
1.3.1 Funding Fragility and Differences in Supply
What explains the dispersion in aggregate supply across lenders, the variation
in the lender fixed effects φb? In line with previous research documenting that
low liquidity contributed to lower credit issuance during the crisis (Ivashina and
Scharfstein 2010; Cornett et al. 2011; Brunnermeier 2008; Gorton and Metrick
2012; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010; Ramcharan, den Heuvel, and Verani 2013),
this section shows mortgage lenders were more likely to cut supply during the
recession if they relied on funding sources that proved fragile in the crisis. As
discussed in Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005), mortgage loans can usu-
ally be funded in one of three ways: (i) via loan sales in the secondary market,
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or through balance sheet retention; (ii) if kept in the balance sheet, through
wholesale debt or deposit-like liabilities; (iii) if sold in the secondary market,
through loan sales to the GSEs (e.g. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae), or
through sales to private buyers. I measure each of these three funding strategies
by combining lender data from HMDA and the Federal Reserve’s FRY-9C.
Table 1.5 reports results from regressions of differences in lender supply
(φb) against differences in funding strategy over 2005-2007 (see also Figure 1.5)
for the banks in the sample. Column 1 shows 72 percent of the variation in
supply differences is explained by variation in reliance on wholesale debt, loan
sales in general, and particularly sales to private investors.9 Column 2 shows
that lower prerecession capital ratios are also associated with declines in credit
supply, though this factor is relatively minor, judging by its 5 percentage point
contribution to the R-squared (Column 2). Column 3 shows that, in contrast,
prerecession credit growth (over 2003-2006) is not helpful in explaining variation
in differences in supply during the Great Recession. Observations are weighted
by the dollar amount of mortgage originations in 2007, although the weighting
is not critical, as the last column shows.
I measure bank-level exposure to wholesale funding as the ratio of non-core
funding (sum of large time deposits, foreign deposits, repo sold, other borrowed
money, subordinated debt, and federal funds purchased) to total assets, from
the Federal Reserve’s FRY-9C form, a standard definition in the literature (Irani
and Meisenzahl 2015). To measure lender exposure to the secondary market,
I use data from HMDA, which provides loan sales in the secondary market by
9In complementary work, Dagher and Kazimov (2012) find that mortgage lenders more
reliant on wholesale funding were more likely to reject mortgage applications during the
recession, after controlling for various borrower characteristics.
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year and type of buyer. Reliance on loan sales is measured as the share of loans
originated and sold to total originations over 2005-2007. Exposure to private
securitization is measured as the ratio of private investor loan sales to total loan
sales over 2005-2007.10
Measuring reliance on loan sales to private buyers is important since private-
label residential mortgage securitization, which funded about 30% of mortgages
over 2005-2007, went to essentially zero in 2008-2010 (Frame et al. 2015); see also
Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2011), and Nadauld and Sherlund (2009)). Be-
cause private investors stopped purchasing nongovernment-insured mortgages,
lenders reliant on those sales likely cut supply during 2008-2010. For example,
Calem, Covas, and Wu (2013) find that banks who were pre-recession more de-
pendent on loan sales experienced more severe declines in jumbo lending, which
are loans too large to be purchased by GSEs, and thus can only be sold to
private investors, during the recession.
Loan sales to GSEs also became more expensive. G-fees, the monthly in-
surance fee GSEs charge as a fixed fraction of the loan balance, increased from
about 20 basis points in 2005-2007 to 30 basis points in 2008-2010 (Fuster et al.
2013). Putback risk also increased in 2008. Lenders are required to repurchase
loans sold to GSEs if it is found that those loans fail to satisfy original under-
writing standards. While putbacks were rare, they rose during the recession,
with Fannie Mae estimating that 3.7 percent of single-family loans purchased
over 2005-2008 were putback to lenders, whereas the figure in other periods
tended to be less than 0.5 percent11
10Private loan sales are defined as loan sales to any buyers excluding FNMA, FAMC,
GNMA, FHLMC, and lender affiliates.
11source: Fannie Mae 10-K 2013, p. 143
17
1.4 The Nonlocal Lending Shock
Differences in lender supply affected counties differently, because of variation in
the intensity of preexisting county-lender relationships, as measured by market
shares prior to the recession. The credit supply instrument – the nonlocal
lending shock – is the weighted average, for county i, of lender supply shocks in
the recession φb (from equation 1.1). The weights are county-lender 2005-2007
mortgage origination market shares. The sum is taken over all large multimarket
lenders in the sample B, as discussed in section 2.3:




Counties had below-average access to mortgage credit, all else equal, if
they had existing relationships (as measured by 2005-2007 market shares) with
lenders with below-average supply in the recession. New lender entry would
work towards offsetting the decline in credit supply by the locality’s traditional
lenders. In the extreme case of perfectly substitutability, lender entry would
fully offset the reduction in supply by the locality’s traditional lenders.
The instrument, however, is not weak with the first stage F statistic in
the baseline over 20. I provide evidence of both highly persistent county-lender
relations prior to the crisis, and of limited new lender entry during the recession.
First, county-lender market shares are highly persistent year-on-year. Table 1.6
shows results from regressing 2007 county-lender market shares on 2005 shares.
Column 1 shows that 2005 shares explain 92 percent of the variation in 2007
shares, with the coefficient on the 2005 shares equal to 0.91. The left panel of
Figure 1.6 plots 2007 shares against 2005 shares. Moreover, the relationship
between 2005 and 2007 shares is highly stable across localities. The correlation
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coefficient and R-squared are very similar when focusing only on high credit
score counties or only low credit score counties (Columns 2 and 3), or when
using county fixed effects (Column 4). The persistence in credit relationship
extends to at least the early 2000s. The right panel in Figure 1.6 plots 2000
market shares against 2007 market shares; there is a strong positive association,
with 2000 shares explaining 71 percent of the variation in 2007 shares.
As for limited entry, I find few cases of lenders entering new counties in
the recession: of all county-lender pairs in 2008-2010, only 7.85% were new
matchings. The lack of entry suggests substantial switching costs across lenders
during the recession. Part of the reason for low new entry may be that only a
handful of lenders were expanding during the recession. Because most lenders
were contracting, they may not have been looking to expand into new locali-
ties.12 The contraction in lending by many mortgage lenders, particularly the
larger ones, is also documented in Gete and Reher (2016) and Chen, Hanson,
and Stein (2017).
The findings in this paper on persistent credit relationships and limited en-
try during the recession are in line with the literature documenting stickiness
in mortgage credit relationships and limited shopping in the mortgage market
in spite of significant price dispersion. In a survey of recent mortgage borrow-
ers, Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) report that close to half of the borrowers
did not do any shopping. Woodward and Hall (2012) also find that borrowers
engage in too little shopping, and “sacrifice at least $1,000 by shopping from
too few brokers.” Lacko and Pappalardo (2010) shows that mortgage borrowers
12These statistics are based on the 56 lenders in the sample as described in section 2.3.
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are often severely uninformed about key costs associated with getting a mort-
gage, with half of respondents having problems identifying the loan amount,
and two-thirds being unaware of prepayment penalties, for example. Moreover,
Mondragon (2018) and Nguyen (2014) find evidence for stickiness in the mort-
gage market, in line with the large literature showing substantial switching costs
for firms, as recently discussed in Chodorow-Reich (2014).
The main concern with instrument validity is that the credit supply instru-
ment, county exposure to lender supply shocks, may be correlated with unob-
served characteristics of counties affecting employment. It would be sufficient
(but not necessary) if lender location is randomly distributed across counties.
That is unlikely to be the case, however. Below-average suppliers in the recession
may have been more likely to locate in subprime counties (for example) prior to
the crisis. To the extent I can observe and control for the fraction of subprime
borrowers (and other relevant local characteristics), I can isolate the ‘as good
as random’ variation in lender location. To that end, I employ a detailed set of
prerecession county characteristics, including the subprime share, that explains
close to 60 percent of the cross-sectional variation in mortgage credit changes
over 2007-2010, described in Table 1.3. The controls include: measures the run-
up in house prices during the boom; industry composition; loan characteristics
such as local incidence of FHA or investor loans; demographics; and measures
of local lending competitiveness.13 Figure 1.7 is a map of the nonlocal lending
13Previous literature has established that different household characteristics are associated
with the severity of the housing boom and bust. For the incidence in subprime lending,
see: Keys et al. (2010),Demyanyk and Hemert (2011), Dell1Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2012),
Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2008), and Mian and Sufi (2009). For the growth in household
debt to income, see: Mian and Sufi (2014), and Carroll and Kimball (1996). For demographics:
Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010). For loan characteristics: Haughwout et al. 2011; Chinco and
Mayer 2016; Bhutta 2015; Bhutta and Ringo 2014
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shock, after controlling for a detailed set of county covariates. The map appears
balanced with no apparent trends by region.
Conditional on the detailed set of county observables used in the paper, I
find evidence consistent with ‘as good as random’ county-lender matching both
in the boom and before. The results in the paper are robust to measuring
county exposure to lender shocks using 2000-2002 shares (instead of 2005-2007
shares). This addresses the concern that risky lenders may have located in risky
counties during the housing boom. As for potential non-random county-lender
matching before the 2000s, I produce results using no, region, division, or state
fixed effects; substantially different estimates would be evidence of correlated
fixed effects at regional levels for employment outcomes and lender location
i.e., regional county-lender matching. However, estimates are consistent across
specifications. As discussed shortly, I perform various other checks that find
support for the exclusion restriction, including ‘placebo’ tests; controlling for
declines in small business lending in the recession; and the inclusion of large,
failed lenders (e.g. IndyMac) in the analysis.
1.5 Empirical Framework and Results
I now discuss results based on the following 2SLS specification:
∆Outcomeji θXi   β
{∆Crediti   fs   εi (1.3)
∆Crediti δXi   ρNonlocal Lending Shocki   fs   vi (1.4)
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where observations are at the county i level; changes are over 2007-2010 for
different outcome variables j (house sales, house prices, employment) each esti-
mated separately; and fs are fixed effects that could be at the region, division,
or state level – I report results for each. Table 1.3 defines the set of prerecession
county controls Xi as well as the outcome variables. The nonlocal lending shock
is the credit supply instrument defined in equation 1.2. All of the outcome
variables are expressed as percent changes over 2007-2010. For employment
categories and the home price index, changes are taken between 2007Q4 and
2010Q4. For mortgage credit (a flow) changes are taken between the average
dollar flow over 2008-2010 with respect to the value in 2007.14 Mortgage flows
are deflated using the GDP deflator.15
Out of roughly 3,200 counties, I use data on slightly over the 1,000 largest
counties in the U.S. (those having over 15,000 households in the 2000 Decen-
nial Census), which account for 85% of aggregate employment. I drop states
having 3 or fewer counties, to have at least a few observations per state for
the specifications that use state fixed effects. Observations are weighted by the
number of employed workers in 2006, though results are very similar without
weighting.16 Extreme observations (1% from each tail) are dropped from each
dependent variable.17 Standard errors are clustered at the division level to allow
14Using 2005-2007 as the base period produces nearly identical results, for example, the
correlation between ∆Crediti using 2007 as the base period and using 2005-2007 as the base
is ρ  .87. Table 10 in the Online Appendix reports the main estimation results using 2005-
2007 as the base.
15Alternatively, ∆Crediti could be defined as the percent change in the number of mortgage
originations, with very similar results; Table 11 in the Online Appendix shows the main 2SLS
results when doing so.
16Table 12 in the Online Appendix reports unweighted results for counties with over 40,000
households in the 2000 Decennial Census – these close to 500 counties account for 76% of
total employment.
17For example, I drop house price growth outliers from the house price regression, but I
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for correlated shocks within broad geographic regions due to, for example, state
or division-specific institutional arrangements and spatial correlation.18 Esti-
mates are robust to alternatives, such as clustering at the commuting zone level
(Table 13 in the Online Appendix).
1.5.1 First Stage Results
The nonlocal lending shock has significant independent explanatory power over
local changes in mortgage credit in the Great Recession, consistent with high
switching costs across lenders. Table 1.7 reports first stage regression results;
all the controls listed in Table 1.3 are included (e.g. the share of subprime
borrowers, measures of the severity of the housing boom, and various demo-
graphic, industry, and loan characteristics) though only the nonlocal lending
shock coefficient estimates are reported, to economize on space. Columns 1-
4 include varying degrees of spatial fixed effects, ranging from none (Column
1) to region, division, and state fixed effects (Columns 2-4 respectively). The
R-squared is reasonably high in all specifications (60 percent or higher), indicat-
ing that the regression controls are helpful in explaining variation in mortgage
credit issuance. Across specifications, the coefficient estimate on the instrument
is positive and strongly significant. For example, in the specification without
spatial fixed effects (Column 1), a 10 percent reduction in the nonlocal lending
shock is associated with a 4.99 percent decline in mortgage credit issuance; the
don’t drop those counties from the private employment growth regression (unless they are also
outliers in that variable). The only exception is growth in house sales for which I winsorize
5% of observations.
18The Census divides the US into 9 divisions – New England, Middle Atlantic, East North
Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Moun-
tain, and Pacific.
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first stage F statistic is slightly over 20.
The instrument has considerably explanatory power in all models with differ-
ent spatial fixed effects. The first stage F statistic, associated with the hypothe-
sis that the coefficient on the credit supply instrument is zero conditional on the
observables, is over 10 in all the specifications, a rule of thumb commonly used
to indicate weak instrument problems (Stock and Yogo 2002). The F statistic is
lowest in the specification with state fixed effects (10.55), since this specification
uses less information (only within-state variation in the instrument).
1.5.2 Effects of Supply Reductions on Residential Mar-
kets
Supply-driven, exogenous declines in mortgage credit are statistically associated
with declines in home sales, home prices, and increases in delinquency rates as
well as foreclosure rates. This is evidence of the negative effects of declines in
mortgage supply on the health of local housing markets. The mechanism is that
reductions in mortgage supply reduce the ability of households to buy homes
and to refinance. Table 1.8 reports two stage least squares results for different
housing market outcomes in the models with region fixed effects and standard
errors clustered at the division level. I use region fixed effects in the baseline,
though I provide results with other spatial fixed effects in the Online Appendix
and in some cases throughout the paper.
Declines in credit supply are associated with declines in home permit is-
suance. Column 1 shows that a 10 percent reduction in mortgage credit (when
instrumented using the nonlocal lending shock) is associated with a 10.37 per-
cent decline in the issuance of new residential permits – essentially a one-to-one
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effect. This is evidence that households were unable to offset the reduction in
credit availability originating from nonlocal sources by borrowing from private
sources or from lenders other than their traditional, prerecession lenders.
Declines in mortgage credit are also associated with declines in home prices.
A 10 percent reduction in mortgage credit is associated with a 5.92 percent
decline in home prices.19 The effect operates through the extensive margin –
fewer loans were taken out, which led to lower housing demand and caused
declines in home prices. Measuring changes in mortgage credit using declines in
the number of loans, rather than in the real dollar value, yields nearly identical
results.20
Delinquency rates and foreclosure rates also increased more in counties with
below-average supply. Table 1.8 shows that a 10 percent decline in mortgage
credit is associated with 1.33 and 0.79 percentage point increases in delinquency
and foreclosure rates. This is evidence of the contractionary effects of reductions
in mortgage supply on the health of local housing markets. The fall in home
prices induced by the credit shock would make it more likely for households to
go underwater.
In the Online Appendix I present results for the each dependent variable with
no fixed effects, region, division, or state fixed effects. The main conclusions are
essentially the same. The point estimates are very similar. For example, a 10
percent reduction in mortgage credit is associated with a 5.10, 5.92, 6.99, and
19This is consistent with other articles finding that supply-driven changes in credit have real
effects on home prices, such as Favara and Imbs (2015), Mian and Sufi (2011), Adelino, Schoar,
and Severino (2012), Favara and Imbs (2015), DiMaggio and Kermani (2014), Anenberg et al.
(2016), Vojtech, Kay, and Driscoll (2016), Passmore and Sherlund (2016), and Kung (2015).
20The coefficient estimate in the model with region fixed effects when using declines in the
real dollar value of mortgages is .592 while it is .601 when using declines in the number of
loans.
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5.59 percent decline in home prices in the models without, region, division, and
state fixed effects respectively (Table 2 of the Online Appendix).
1.5.3 Effects of Supply Reductions on Employment
Declines in mortgage supply contributed to the job losses in the recession,
though to a moderate extent. The job losses explained by the mortgage shock
are concentrated in construction and financial services, a category of employ-
ment where over a third of workers are real estate intermediaries. The likely
mechanism is that reductions in supply caused declines in housing demand,
which negatively affected employment in industries reliant on housing demand.
As evidence for this, I find that the construction losses are stronger in areas
where housing supply is more elastic, that is, in areas where construction re-
sponds more to changes in housing demand. Overall, a supply-driven plausibly
exogenous decline in mortgage credit issuance is associated with a 1 percent de-
cline in total private employment. Using the in-sample variation of the nonlocal
lending shock, I estimate that about 15 percent of the employment losses in the
Great Recession can be explained by declines in mortgage supply.
Weak mortgage supply contributed to job losses in the construction sec-
tor. Table 1.9 shows that a 10 percent decline in mortgage credit originating
from nonlocal sources is associated with a 5.14 percent decline in construction
employment for the model with region fixed effects, with results being simi-
lar for the other specifications. The mechanism is that declines in mortgage
supply reduce housing demand, which is associated with lower employment in
construction.
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The employment losses in construction were, for a given decline in instru-
mented credit, more severe in areas where housing supply is more elastic.21 That
is, in areas where construction responds more strongly to changes in housing
demand, the employment effects of a given credit decline were stronger. To
see this, I focus on the sample of counties for which the Saiz (2010) measure
of the elasticity of housing supply is available.22 Table 1.10 reports results for
changes in home permits for new construction and construction employment
for the model with region fixed effects. The coefficient estimate is positive for
the interaction of credit changes and housing supply elasticity and significant at
the 5% level for construction employment (Column 2). For the permits model
(Column 4), the interaction is also positive, though marginally insignificant
(p-value  .169). That is, the same relative decrease (increase) in credit is as-
sociated with lower (higher) permit issuance and construction employment in
areas with higher housing supply elasticities. This is evidence for the mechanism
that reductions in mortgage supply reduced housing demand and contributed
to employment losses in construction.
Declines in mortgage supply also caused job losses in finance. Table 1.9
shows that a 10 percent reduction in mortgage credit is associated with a 3.90
percent decline in employment in financial services in the model with region
fixed effects. The likely mechanism again is that reductions in supply negatively
21I add the interaction of credit changes and the housing supply elasticity to the regression
model with region fixed effects. For the two endogenous regressors (credit changes and the
interaction of credit changes and the housing supply elasticitiy), I use two instruments – the
nonlocal lending shock, and the interaction of the nonlocal lending shock with the housing
supply elasticity.
22Saiz (2010) estimates housing supply elasticity as a nonlinear combination of data on
physical and regulatory building constraints and population levels in 2000 at the metro area
level.
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affected housing demand, and therefore demand for housing intermediaries.
Via the effects on construction and financial employment, declines in mort-
gage credit led to declines in total private employment. Table 1.9 shows two
stage least squares results for different employment categories, including total
private employment. Column 3 shows that a 10 percent reduction in mort-
gage credit originating from nonlocal sources is associated with a significant
1.14 percent decline in total private employment. The models with other types
of spatial fixed effects have similar point estimates, as reported in Table 7 of
the Online Appendix, though confidence intervals are wider, especially when
division or state fixed effects are used. In the specification with state fixed ef-
fects, for example, a 10 percent reduction in instrumented mortgage credit is
associated with a 0.73 percent decline in employment. Standard errors tend to
be larger in the state fixed effects specifications, since they use less informa-
tion (only within-state variation). The point estimates, however, tend to be
very similar. The Online Appendix reports estimates for all of the dependent
variables discussed in the paper for specifications with no spatial fixed effects,
region, division, and state fixed effects.
Declines in mortgage supply are only weakly associated with declines in
employment in other, broader employment categories – ‘other employment’ (to-
tal private excluding construction and finance) and nontradable employment,
which mostly consists of local retail and food. These are shown in Table 1.9,
Columns 4 and 5 respectively. The coefficient estimates are close to zero and
not significant. That is, the negative shock on local real estate markets did
not appear to significantly spillover to broader local employment categories.
One possibility is that the real estate shock did have large spillover effects, but
28
that those effects were nonlocal, and were instead dispersed through localities
through the tradable sector. However, there is little evidence that the local real
estate shock had large spillover effects on the local nontradable sector (Column
5). In Boldrin et al. (2016) the spillover between a housing shock to the rest
of the economy depends on the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and housing. The results in this paper suggest the (local) elasticity is relatively
low.
The elasticity estimates of other and nontradable employment also contrast
with their OLS counterparts, which are about three times larger and strongly
significant, with t-statistics ranging from 3 to 8 across specifications, as shown
in Table 1.11. That the OLS coefficients are larger suggests that they are biased
upward, due to reverse causality – employment losses may lead to declines in
mortgage issuance. The credit supply instrument is strong, and helps predict
declines in real estate activity, such as declines in home permits, home prices,
and construction employment. But it does not help explain substantial job
losses in industries less directly related to real estate. This ameliorates concerns
about reverse causality – if local employment shocks were correlated with the
instrument, then the 2SLS estimates for broad employment categories would
likely be large and significant.
In parallel work Mondragon (2018) also estimates the county level elastic-
ity of employment with respect to mortgage supply during the recession. We
both find that reductions in mortgage supply mattered for employment in the
recession, though the estimated effects in Mondragon (2018) are substantially
higher. He estimates that a 10 percent decline in instrumented mortgage credit
is associated with a 3 percent decline in employment, an elasticity two times as
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large as the OLS counterpart, and three times as large as my own estimate.23
The main difference between the papers is the credit supply instrument; his in-
strument is prerecession exposure to Wachovia Bank, a troubled lender acquired
by Wells Fargo in late 2008.24 One reason his estimates are likely larger is ‘bad’
bank in a ‘bad’ region matching – Wachovia had a larger presence in states in
the South Atlantic such as Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina where
job losses were among the worst in the country.
The Wachovia instrument significantly weakens when controlling for char-
acteristics of localities correlated with both Wachovia location and employment
losses during the recession. For example, using only division or state fixed ef-
fects greatly diminishes the statistical power of the Wachovia instrument. To see
this, I obtain Wachovia 2005-2006 purchase shares from HMDA and restrict the
sample to counties in the South and East. The first stage F statistic associated
with the Wachovia instrument is 14.47, absent other controls including regional
fixed effects. When including division (state) fixed effects, the F statistic drops
to 4.33 (0.93).25 In contrast, the results in my paper are very similar when using
no fixed effects, or region, division, or state fixed effects. Moreover, it is not the
case that the results are different because Wachovia was a particularly troubled
lender. In fact, Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo, the strongest lender of
the top 4. As discussed shortly, the results in this paper are very similar even
23These estimates replicate the earlier Mondragon (2014). In more recent versions, changes
in Mondragon’s specifications such as variable standardization and sample restrictions make
replicating Mondragon (2018) less straightforward.
24Mondragon (2018) continues to use Wachovia as the key source of identification as in
earlier versions (Mondragon 2014), though the more recent version uses a few other regional
lenders as a robustness check.
25Observations are weighted by population in 2006, and standard errors are clustered by
state. These results are available upon request.
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when including large, failed lenders in the analysis such as IndyMac, which was
not rescued by another institution.
1.5.4 Aggregate Implications
Overall, I find that reductions in mortgage supply could explain close to close
to 15 percent of the employment losses in the U.S. over 2007-2010, or about 1.1
million of the jobs lost. This is evidence that reductions in mortgage supply
mattered for employment. The imputation is based on a partial equilibrium
aggregation exercise that answers the counterfactual question: what if counties,
all else equal, had experienced the best credit shock in the sample – specifically,
the credit shock of the counties in the top 5 percent of the distribution? The
improvement in supply generates employment gains via the estimated elasticity
of employment with respect to mortgage supply. This approach addresses the
challenge that the level effect of supply reductions cannot be recovered from the
cross-section by assuming that the top percentile of counties by the credit supply
instrument represent a ‘no credit shock’ scenario. This is a standard aggregation
exercise in this literature, with similar approaches in Chodorow-Reich (2014)
and Mian and Sufi (2014). The estimate would be biased downwards if the top
percentile counties also experienced a reduction in supply. The severe disrup-
tions in mortgage supply in the recession affecting wholesale funding markets
and loan sales in the secondary market suggest the assumption is conservative.
First, define the counterfactual employment change in county i, ∆Empcfi ,
as the predicted employment if county i had experienced the nonlocal lending
shock of county zero (NLS0), rather than its own (NLSi), after conditioning
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on all other observables Xi:
∆Empcfi Er∆Empi|NLSi  NLS0, Xis
∆zEmpi   βp∆{CreditipNLS0q  ∆{CreditipNLSiqq
∆{Empi   βρpNLS0 NLSiq
where ∆{Empi denotes the fitted value from the private employment regression
model with region fixed effects, β is the estimated elasticity of employment
with respect to mortgage supply, and ρ is the coefficient on the nonlocal lending
shock in the first stage regression. I then recover the end-period levels of employ-
ment corresponding to both the counterfactual and fitted changes in employ-
ment, using the initial-period employment level: Empcfi,2010Q4  Empi,2007Q4p1 
∆Empcfi q and
zEmpi,2010Q4  Empi,2007Q4p1 ∆zEmpiq. Then, the total job loss
explained by variation in the nonlocal lending shock is given by:













The exercise indicates that the decline in mortgage supply can explain 14
percent of the employment losses in the Great Recession, when defining county
zero as the 95th percentile county by the credit supply instrument, and using
the coefficient point estimate β  0.114 from the region fixed effects model.
There is uncertainty around β, however. For example, β  0.073 in the model
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with state fixed effects. Using the latter, the aggregation exercise suggests the
mortgage credit supply shock explains 9 percent of the job losses during the
recession. Alternatively, the 95 percent confidence interval for β in the region
fixed effects specification ranges from 0.048 to 0.179; using this range, the decline
in mortgage supply explains between 6 and 22 percent of the job losses during
the recession.
Another important parameter choice is which counties are used as the ‘no
credit shock’ reference. The baseline uses the 95th percentile as the baseline. If
localities in the top 5 percent of the credit supply distribution also experienced
a reduction in credit supply, the aggregation exercise will deliver an under-
estimate. When using the top 1 percent as a reference instead, the aggregation
exercise suggests declines in mortgage supply can explain 21 percent of the job
losses in the recession.
The bottom line of these aggregation exercises is that the reduction in mort-
gage supply likely aggravated the job loss during the recession, though mod-
erately so. 14 percent of the total job losses is sizable – about 1 million jobs
lost is hardly small – but it is far from the bulk of the job losses, as argued by
Mondragon (2018) and particularly Mondragon (2014) which attributed about
60 percent of the total job losses (at a minimum) to household credit supply
shocks. In sum, the evidence in this paper adds nuance to the debate of “what
explains the job losses during the recession?” The answer provided by this pa-
per is that mortgage supply shocks mattered, though moderately. This suggests
that other factors – the decline in household net worth (Mian and Sufi 2014),
increase in uncertainty (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2015), or credit supply reduc-




I test for the validity and interpretation of the main results of the paper along
several dimensions. As discussed, a concern is that lenders with below-average
supply systematically located in counties with below-average employment shocks
during the boom – perhaps risky lenders moved to risky counties during the
boom years. I measure the credit supply instrument as in equation 1.2, with
the same lender shocks during the recession φb, but this time using 2000-2002
market shares (instead of 2005-2007 as in the baseline).




Figure 1.8 plots the baseline credit supply instrument measure against the in-
strument measured with 2000-2002 shares; the R-squared is close to 64 percent.
Table 1.12 reports 2SLS results based on county exposure to lender shocks, with
the exposure measured in 2000-2002. For identification, the important thing is
the point estimates are very similar, which is evidence that βj are estimated
consistently for different models j. The point estimates are indeed similar; for
example, β is .106 in the total employment model (Column 3) while it is 0.114
in the baseline reported in Table 1.9, well within one standard error. The esti-
mates are noisier – in the baseline, the first stage F statistic was 27.16 whereas
in this specification it is 15.91 – as is expected, due to the noise in measuring
lender location in the early 2000s rather than immediately prior to the crisis.
I also run ‘placebo’ tests on the first and second stage equations. First, I
regress yearly changes between mortgage credit (2000-2013) at the county-level
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on the nonlocal lending shock and all the county controls in the baseline case.
Figure 1.9 plots the coefficient estimates and associated 95 percent confidence
intervals on a year-by-year basis. The mortgage credit shock helps explain
credit changes over 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 only, and not during any of the
prerecession years.26 Second, I repeat the main 2SLS elasticity estimates, but
now using left-hand side variables (e.g. employment changes) measured over the
last two recessions: i) 1990-1992, during which the unemployment rate increased
from 5.6 to 7.5 percent; and ii) 2000-2003, during which the unemployment rate
increased from 4 percent (lowest since 1970) to 6 percent in 2003 – the previous
two recessions also considered in Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and Montoriol-Garriga
(2015). Table 1.13 reports elasticity estimates for construction and total private
employment. If coefficient estimates are positive and significant, that would
indicate counties with below-average supply during the Great Recession tend to
experience below-average employment shocks during other recessions, possibly
for other unobserved characteristics of localities. However, the estimates are
insignificant, except for changes in total private employment over 1990-1992,
though in this case the coefficient estimate has the opposite sign (negative rather
than positive).
In the baseline results of the paper, I did not include institutions that filed
for bankruptcy (and were not acquired by another lender), because the portion
of lending changes that is nonlocal cannot be plausibly isolated for these lenders,
since lending for these institutions fell by 100% everywhere (there is no variation
26Making a similar coefficient plot using a different dependent variable (e.g. total private
employment) yields non-significant coefficient estimates. The reason is there are efficiency
gains with lumping the recession years into a single cross-section. Results available upon
request.
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across localities). This is a conservative choice. The inclusion of these lenders
might lead to biased elasticity estimates. On the other hand, their exclusion
likely decreases the statistical power of the estimation approach. I add to the
sample the ten largest multimarket lenders who failed over 2005-2010.27 Table
1.14 reports two stage least squares estimates when the credit supply instrument
includes these large failed lenders. Their addition leads to a small increase in
the first stage F statistic. Moreover, the second stage estimates are very similar
to the baseline. Some are a bit higher and some a bit smaller, though all within
one standard error of the baseline estimates.
I also check whether coefficient estimates are statistically different when
adding additional controls. In particular, I add squared and cubed terms of
some of the most important drivers of the housing boom and bust identified in
the literature: the runup in home prices over 2003-2006, 2006 debt-to-income,
and the fraction of borrowers in a county with FICO scores less than 620.
Table 1.15 reports the main regressions of the paper (with region fixed effects),
this time including as additional explanatory variables the squared and cubed
prerecession terms of these three variables. The results are essentially identical,
ameliorating concern about omitted variable bias. The total private employment
coefficient estimate is 0.126, compared with 0.114 in the baseline.
Finally, I show that the results in the paper are robust to controlling for
realized declines in small business lending over 2007-2010, which I obtain from
the Community Reinvestment Act dataset. I average the flow of new busi-
ness originations over 2008-2010, and compute percent changes with respect to
27American Home Mortgage, New Century Financial, IndyMac, Fremont Investment, WMC
Mortgage, Lehman, Ameriquest, Option One, First Magnus, and Taylor, Bean, & Whitaker
Mortgage.
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2007. Table 1.16 shows that controlling for the change in small business lending
does not affect the main results of the paper. This is evidence that the mort-
gage credit shock discussed in this paper is carefully identified, and pertains
specifically to changes in the availability of mortgage credit. The total private
employment coefficient estimate is 0.111, compared with 0.114 in the baseline.
Part of the reason why the two channels are distinct is that the exposure of
localities to small business and mortgage lenders is only weakly correlated. In
other words, the small business lenders to a locality are often not the same as
the mortgage lenders. Figure 1.10 plots HMDA shares against CRA shares for
the top 4 banks; they are only weakly correlated.
1.6 Conclusion
One of the leading narratives of the Great Recession is the credit crunch view
– disruptions in financial markets limited the supply of new credit, which re-
duced the spending capacity of households and firms and lowered aggregate
demand and employment, as discussed in prominent models of the Great Re-
cession (Eggertsson and Krugman 2012; Guerrieri and Lorenzoni 2011; Midrigan
and Philippon 2016). This paper contributes to this literature by empirically
quantifying the employment effects of changes in mortgage credit supply. The
emphasis on mortgages complements existing research the majority of which
focuses on corporate credit supply shocks (Chodorow-Reich 2014; Greenstone,
Mas, and Nguyen 2015).
To do so, I construct a county level mortgage credit supply instrument, which
exploits two sources of heterogeneity: differences in the extent to which lenders
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cut supply in the Great Recession for nonlocal reasons, and variation in the
intensity of county-lender relations coming into the recession. I then estimate
the effect of changes in mortgage supply on employment, net of other possibly
confounding factors affecting spending during the recession.
By quantifying the effects of mortgage supply reductions, this paper adds
nuance to the debate on the drivers of the job losses during the Great Reces-
sion. Overall, the bottom line is that mortgage supply shocks mattered for
employment, though only moderately so. Declines in mortgage supply caused
declines in local real estate activity – in residential permits, house prices, and
construction employment, for example – but the evidence does not suggest there
were large spillover effects in other, broader employment categories. A partial
equilibrium aggregation exercise, based on the estimated local elasticity of total
private employment with respect to mortgage supply, indicates that the reduc-
tion in mortgage supply could explain close to 15 percent of the employment
losses in the Great Recession, or about 1.1 million of the jobs lost. In other
words, the reduction in mortgage supply likely aggravated the job losses to a
meaningful extent. But, other factors – the decline in household net worth,
increase in uncertainty, or credit supply reductions to firms – likely explain the
bulk of the job losses in the recession, particularly in sectors less directly linked
to real estate.
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year
Mortgage Originations Private Emp
Case Schiller HPI
Mortgage originations are defined as the dollar value (in trillions) of originations for 1-4 resi-
dential loans for home purchase and improvement. Source: HMDA.
Figure 1.2: County Level Changes in Employment against Changes in Mortgage
Credit Issuance, 2007-2010
The figure plots changes in total private employment (y-axis) against changes in mortgage
credit issuance (x-axis) over 2007-2010 at the county level for locations with over 15,000 hous-
ing units in the 2000 Census. The figure shows the linear coefficient estimate when regressing
changes in employment on changes in mortgage credit issuance. Observations weighted by
population in 2006. Standard errors clustered at the division level.
Figure 1.3: Credit Changes 2007-2010 Versus Changes in 2003-2006
The figure plots changes in mortgage credit over 2007-2010 versus changes in mortgage credit
over 2003-2006 for the large multimarket lenders in the sample.


































































-1 -.5 0 .5
Lender fixed effects φb, high income loans only
The figure plots lender fixed effects (equation 1.1) in the baseline (y-axis) against a specifi-
cation that uses only high-income loans to estimate equation 1.1. Observations are weighted
by the 2007 dollar value of mortgage originations.
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Tier1 Capital/Assets, 2005-07
The variable on the y-axis measures differences in lender supply over 2007-2010, φb from equa-
tion 1.1. Variables on the x-axis are different measures of funding fragility over 2005-2007:
ratio of mortgages originated and sold to total mortgages originated (top left); loans sold to
private investors to total sales (top right); wholesale funding to assets (bottom left); and Tier
1 capital to assets (bottom right). Observations weighted by mortgage originations in 2007.
The banks in the sample are large multimarket lenders located in at least 100 counties and
with originations in excess of $1 billion in 2007.
Figure 1.6: Persistent Market Shares
The left panel plots county-lender HMDA market shares in 2007 (y-axis) against market
shares in 2005 (x-axis). The right panel plots county-lender HMDA market shares in 2007 (y-
axis) against market shares in 2000 (x-axis). Lenders in the sample were located in at least
100 counties, issued over $1 billion in mortgage originations in 2007, and did not fail during
the crisis. Counties in the sample had over 15,000 housing units in the 2000 Census.
Figure 1.7: Nonlocal Lending Shock
The map plots the residual variation in the credit supply instrument (the nonlocal lending
shock) after regressing the credit supply instrument on the county controls used through-
out the paper and defined in Table 1.3. The instrument is defined in equation 1.2. The
map sorts the nonlocal lending shock into quartiles for counties in the sample. Darker
tones indicate relatively stronger supply. Missing observations left blank (in white).
Figure 1.8: Nonlocal Lending Shock using 2000-2002 Market Shares
This figure plots the baseline credit supply instrument (nonlocal lending shock) on the
y-axis, against the credit supply instrument which measures lender location over 2000-
2002 in the x-axis. The baseline instrument measures lender location using 2005-2007
county-lender market shares as defined in equation 1.2.
Figure 1.9: Regressing Yearly Mortgage Credit Changes on Nonlocal Lending
Shock
Figure shows coefficient estimates (ρt) and 95 percent confidence intervals when regressing
yearly mortgage credit changes at the county-level on the nonlocal lending shock NLSi
and the other controls used in the baseline specification: ΔCrediti,t ρtNLSi γXi υi
for t 2001, 2002, ...2014
Figure 1.10: County-Lender Market Shares in HMDA and CRA
The figure plots mortgage 2007 market shares from HMDA (y-axis) against 2007 small busi-
ness loan market shares from the CRA (x-axis) for each of the big-4 lenders.
Table 1.1: County Summary Statistics
Dependent Variables, 2007-2010 percent changes
Mean SD p10 Median p90 N
∆ Private Emp -0.065 0.048 -0.126 -0.063 -0.008 1063
∆ Construction Emp -0.241 0.143 -0.415 -0.248 -0.058 1063
∆ Finance Emp -0.080 0.089 -0.188 -0.082 0.024 1063
∆ Other Emp -0.049 0.050 -0.111 -0.049 0.012 1063
∆ Nontradable Emp -0.045 0.065 -0.119 -0.051 0.037 1063
∆ Home Prices -0.139 0.103 -0.285 -0.126 -0.012 1063
∆ Delinquency  90 Days 0.039 0.023 0.018 0.032 0.070 1063
∆ Foreclosures 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.011 0.025 1063
∆ Mortgage Credit -0.376 0.116 -0.516 -0.387 -0.218 1063
Prerecession Characteristics, 2006 levels and 2003-2006 percent changes
∆ Home Prices 0.249 0.170 0.068 0.203 0.505 1063
Debt to Income 1.778 0.595 1.171 1.640 2.597 1063
Median Income (thousands) $48 $12 $37 $45 $66 1063
Median FICO 710 32 660 716 747 1063
% FICO  620 0.269 0.082 0.172 0.257 0.389 1063
% Owner-Occupied Loans 0.849 0.078 0.755 0.869 0.921 1063
% Conventional Loans 0.82 0.11 0.67 0.83 0.95 1063
% GSE-securitized Loans 0.66 0.14 0.49 0.69 0.78 1063
Construction Share of Emp 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.18 1063
Tradable Share of Emp 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.23 1063
% White Population 0.86 0.13 0.69 0.90 0.98 1063
% Educ ¥ College 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.22 1063
The table provides summary statistics for localities with over 15, 000 households in the 2000
Decennial Census. For prerecession characteristics, level variables are measured in 2006 while
percent changes are taken over 2003-2006 with 2003 as the base year. The change in delin-
quency and foreclosure rates is in percentage points. For stocks, changes are taken between
2010Q4 and 2007Q4. For flow variables, changes are taken between the average flow over
2008-2010 and the value in 2007.
Table 1.2: Lender Summary Statistics
Mean SD p10 Median p90 N
∆ Mortgage Credit 2007-2010 -0.38 0.30 -0.79 -0.37 0.01 56
#Counties 2007 487 475 121 279 1,117 56
Mortgage Credit 2007 (billions) $12.12 $30.76 $1.08 $2.48 $24.39 56
Loan Sales/Loans Originated
2005-2007
0.68 0.25 0.36 0.70 0.99 56
Loans Sold to Private
Investors/Loans Sold 2005-2007
0.60 0.37 0.08 0.64 1.00 56
Wholesale Funding/ Assets
2005-2007
0.44 0.11 0.34 0.44 0.61 31
Tier 1 Capital/Assets 2005-2007 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.09 31
This table provides summary statistics for the lenders in the sample, which are large multi-
market lenders located in at least 100 counties and with originations in excess of $1 billion in
2007.
Table 1.3: Data Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables, 2007-2010 percent changes
Mortgage Credit By county-year, the dollar amount of
originations for 1-4 residential loans for home
purchase and improvement.
HMDA
∆ Credit Percent change in average mortgage credit
over 2008-2010 with respect to 2005-2007
HMDA
∆ Residential Permits Percent change in average permits over
2008-2010 with respect to 2005-2007
Census
∆ House Prices Percent change in house prices from 2007Q4
to 2010Q4.
CoreLogic HPI
∆ Empj Percent change in employment category j
from 2007Q4 to 2010Q4
QCEW
Prerecession Characteristics, 2006 levels and 2003-2006 percent changes
Household Income Median IRS
FICO score Median Equifax CCP
Subprime Fraction of households in a county with
FICO score less than 620)
Equifax CCP
Household Debt-to-Income Median household debt-to-income Mian and Sufi
(2014) Web
Appendix
White population Fraction of population identified as white Census
College population Fraction of population with a college degree
or more
Census
Nonconventional Loans One minus the fraction of loans issued over
2003-2006 identified as conventional loans
McDash
GSE-securitized Loans Fraction of loans issued over 2003-2006
insured by GNMA, FNMA, or FHLMC
McDash
Owner-Occupied Loans Fraction of mortgages over 2003-2006
identified as owner-occupied
HMDA
Herfindahl Index Sum of squared market shares across lenders
in county
HMDA
∆ # Lenders Growth in the number of lenders per county
over 2003-2006
HMDA
∆ House Prices Growth in house prices over 2003Q4-2006Q4 CoreLogic HPI
Construction Construction share of employment QCEW
Tradable Tradable share of employment, where
tradable employment is defined as in Mian
and Sufi (2014)
CBP
Unemp Rate Unemployment Rate BLS LAU
Level Home Prices Log level median house price Census
Level Employment Log level of employed workers QCEW
Level Mortgage Credit Log level of mortgage originations HMDA
This table provides definitions and sources for the data used throughout the paper. Unless
otherwise specified, prerecession level variables are measured in 2006 while growth rates are
taken over 2003-2006. Outcome variables are in percent changes over 2008-2010 with respect
to a prerecession period. For stocks, changes are taken between 2010Q4 and 2007Q4. For
flow variables, that change is taken between the average flow over 2008-2010 and the value
over 2005-2007.
Table 1.4: Lender Rankings by Percent Changes in Mortgage Originations and











US Bank 17% 2 2 7,449
Bank of the West 1% 6 15 1,260
Flagstar -13% 7 13 10,368
Pulaski Mtg Co. -15% 9 27 1,029
Citizens Financial -15% 10 20 1,876
BB&T -15% 11 7 6,836
Provident Funding -18% 13 23 5,644
Toronto Dominion -21% 16 17 2,211
Fifth Third -21% 17 4 6,412
M&T -34% 24 29 3,093
Wells Fargo -37% 27 24 129,800
Everbank -37% 28 18 2,307
UAMC -38% 29 19 4,522
Navy FCU -43% 30 33 3,300
Quicken Loans -45% 33 34 2,838
Pulte -45% 34 31 4,047
Freedom Mtg -47% 36 37 2,463
DHI -48% 38 28 5,086
Regions -49% 39 44 6,305
Suntrust -53% 40 39 27,855
NY Community -54% 41 43 12,011
M&I -55% 42 21 2,546
HSBC -65% 44 52 10,888
Bank of America -65% 45 45 182,100
Citibank -69% 46 47 29,109
Ally Financial -71% 47 46 16,627
PNC -76% 49 49 24,105
JPMorgan Chase -76% 50 41 77,644
First Tennessee -79% 52 51 17,049
Capital One -86% 53 53 8,817
Median across Lenders -37% $2,477
Standard Deviation 30% $30,656
The table shows summary statistics for large nonfailed multimarket lenders in the sample (see
Section 2.3). Column 2 ranks lenders by decline in new mortgage lending. Column 3 ranks
lenders by differences in lender supply, φb from equation 1.1.
Table 1.5: Funding Fragility and Differences in Lender Supply
Dependent variable: φb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Wholesale Debt/Assets 2005-2007 -0.356*** -0.267*** -0.220** -0.424***
(0.071) (0.074) (0.084) (0.124)
Loan Sales/Originations 2005-2007 -0.491*** -0.537*** -0.646*** -0.662***
(0.123) (0.114) (0.146) (0.134)
Private Loan Sales/Originations 2005-2007 -0.380*** -0.452*** -0.528*** -0.559***
(0.113) (0.108) (0.125) (0.128)
Tier1 Capital 2005-2007 0.276** 0.330** 0.336**
(0.113) (0.121) (0.145)
∆ Mortgage Credit 2003-2006 0.126 0.061
(0.108) (0.127)
Weighted Yes Yes Yes No
N 31 31 31 31
R-squared 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.68
Adj R-squared 0.69 0.74 0.74 0.62
The dependent variable measures differences in lender supply over 2007-2010, φb from equa-
tion 1.1. The explanatory variables measure the extent to which banks relied on fragile fund-
ing sources over 2005-2007, and credit growth over 2003-2006. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Banks in the sample are large multimarket lenders as described in Section 2.3. All
variables are standardized. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 lev-
els, respectively.
Table 1.6: Mortgage Market Shares are Highly Persistent Year-on-Year
Dependent variable: County-Lender Market Shares 2007
Bottom FICO quartile Top FICO quartile County FE
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
2005 Market Shares 0.906*** 0.909*** 0.909*** 0.905***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
County FE No No No Yes
R-squared 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.92
Observations 35651 8679 8577 35651
This table show results from regressing 2007 county-lender market shares on 2005 county-
lender market shares. Column 2 restricts the sample to the low FICO score quartile, Column
3 to the high FICO score quartile, and Column 4 includes county fixed effects. The lenders
in the sample are large multimarket lenders located in at least 100 counties and with orig-
inations in excess of $1 billion in 2007. Counties in the sample had over 15,000 households
in the 2000 Decennial Census. Standard errors clustered at the county level. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 1.7: First Stage Results
Dependent variable: ∆ Mortgage Credit 2007-2010
No FE Region FE Division FE State FE
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Nonlocal Lending Shock 0.499*** 0.555*** 0.437*** 0.282**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.76
Adj. R-squared 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.75
First stage F stat 20.85 25.86 13.90 10.55
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045
This table shows the effects of changes in mortgage credit, when instrumented using the non-
local lending shock, on changes in local outcomes for the largest 850 U.S. counties. The non-
local lending shock measures the exposure of counties to lender shocks (see text for details).
Observations weighted by the number of employed workers in 2006. The dependent variable
is winsorized 1 percent in each tail. Standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** indi-
cate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 1.8: Housing Elasticities with respect to Mortgage Supply
Dependent variables 2007-2010:
∆ Permits ∆ Home Price ∆ Delinq. Rate ∆ Foreclosure Rate
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆ Mortgage
Credit 2007-2010 1.037*** 0.592*** -0.133*** -0.079***
(0.15) (0.12) (0.04) (0.02)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.48 0.78 0.79 0.59
First stage F stat 28.23 26.03 27.44 29.32
Observations 951 1028 1031 1032
This table shows the effects of changes in mortgage credit, when instrumented using the non-
local lending shock, on changes in local outcomes for the largest 850 U.S. counties. The nonlo-
cal lending shock measures the exposure of counties to lender shocks (see text for details). All
regressions include region fixed effects and all other observed characteristics of localities used
in the other tables in the paper. Observations weighted by the number of employed workers in
2006. The dependent variable is winsorized 1 percent in each tail. Standard errors clustered
by state. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 1.9: Employment Elasticities with respect to Mortgage Supply
Dependent variables 2007-2010:
∆ Constr. Emp ∆ Fin Emp ∆ Total Emp ∆ Other Emp ∆ Nontr. Emp
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆ Mortgage
Credit 2007-2010 0.514*** 0.390*** 0.114*** 0.038 0.032
(0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.64 0.15 0.47 0.32 0.36
First stage F stat 27.17 25.87 27.16 26.81 25.84
Observations 1001 1026 1027 1027 1025
This table shows the effects of changes in mortgage credit, when instrumented using the non-
local lending shock, on changes in local outcomes for the largest 850 U.S. counties. The nonlo-
cal lending shock measures the exposure of counties to lender shocks (see text for details). All
regressions include region fixed effects and all other observed characteristics of localities used
in the other tables in the paper. Observations weighted by the number of employed workers in
2006. The dependent variable is winsorized 1 percent in each tail. Standard errors clustered
by state. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 1.10: Elasticity of Construction Employment with Housing Supply Inter-
action
Dependent variables 2007-2010:
∆ Constr. Emp ∆ Constr. Emp ∆ Permits ∆ Permits
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆{Credit 2007-10 0.470*** 0.461*** 1.011*** 1.029***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.24) (0.26)
∆{Credit 2007-10
 Elasticity 0.081** 0.184
(0.03) (0.13)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.56 0.56
First stage F stat 19.61 10.10 18.37 9.25
Observations 550 550 524 524
This table shows the effects of changes in mortgage credit over 2007-2010, interacted with
the housing supply elasticity of Saiz (2010), on changes in construction employment and per-
mit issuance during the recession. All regressions include region fixed effects and all other
observed characteristics of localities used in the other tables in the paper (Table 1.3). The
nonlocal lending shock measures the exposure of counties to lender shocks as defined in equa-
tion 1.2. Observations weighted by the number of employed workers in 2006. Standard errors
clustered at the division level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively.
Table 1.11: OLS Estimation Results
Dependent variables:
∆ Permits ∆ Constr. Emp ∆ Total Emp ∆ Other Emp ∆ Nontr. Emp
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆ Mortgage
Credit 2007-2010 0.822*** 0.391*** 0.141*** 0.121*** 0.106***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.49 0.65 0.47 0.33 0.37
Adj. R-squared 0.48 0.64 0.46 0.32 0.35
Observations 951 1001 1027 1027 1025
This table shows that the OLS coefficients when regressing changes in outcome variables (e.g.
home permits) on changes in mortgage credit at the county-level over 2007-2010 while con-
trolling for all prerecession county characteristics listed in Table 1.3. Observations weighted
by the number of employed workers in 2006. Standard errors clustered at the division level.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 1.12: Elasticities With IV Constructed Using 2000-2002 Shares
Dependent variables 2007-2010:
∆ Permits ∆ Constr. Emp ∆ Total Emp ∆ Other Emp ∆ Nontr. Emp
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆ Mortgage
Credit 2007-2010 0.985*** 0.394** 0.106** 0.037 -0.075
(0.20) (0.17) (0.05) (0.06) (0.14)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.49 0.65 0.47 0.31 0.32
First stage F stat 14.68 15.78 15.91 16.40 16.42
Observations 951 1001 1027 1027 1025
This table shows the effects of changes in mortgage credit over 2007-2010, when instrumented
using the nonlocal lending shock based on 2000-2002 market shares (as opposed to the base-
line measure which uses 2005-2007 shares); see equation 1.7. All regressions include region
fixed effects and all other observed characteristics of localities used in the other tables in the
paper (Table 1.3). The nonlocal lending shock measures the exposure of counties to lender
shocks as defined in equation 1.2. Observations weighted by the number of employed workers
in 2006. Standard errors clustered at the division level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 1.13: ‘Placebo’ Regressions
∆ Total 90-92 ∆ Total 00-03 ∆ Constr 90-92 ∆ Constr 00-03
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆ Mortgage
Credit 2007-2010 -0.082** 0.047 0.080 0.175
(0.04) (0.08) (0.17) (0.13)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 972 973 972 971
This table reports results from ‘placebo’ regressions over the previous two recessions. The
dependent variables are in percent change over 1990-1992 and 2000-2003. All regressions in-
clude region fixed effects and all other observed characteristics of localities used in the other
tables in the paper (Table 1.3). Observations weighted by the number of employed workers
in 2006. Standard errors clustered at the division level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 1.14: Elasticity Estimates Including Failed Lenders
Dependent variables 2007-2010:
∆ Permits ∆ Constr. Emp ∆ Total Emp ∆ Other Emp ∆ Nontr. Emp
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆ Mortgage
Credit 2007-2010 1.168*** 0.509*** 0.076* 0.001 0.007
(0.16) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.47 0.64 0.46 0.29 0.35
First stage F stat 31.91 27.76 28.68 28.48 27.28
Observations 951 1001 1027 1027 1025
This table shows the effects of changes in mortgage credit over 2007-2010, when instrumented
using the nonlocal lending shock, including large institutions who filed for bankruptcy over
2005-2010: American Home Mortgage, New Century Financial, IndyMac, Fremont Invest-
ment, WMC Mortgage, Lehman, Ameriquest, Option One, First Magnus, and Taylor, Bean,
& Whitaker Mortgage. All equations include region fixed effects and all other observed char-
acteristics of localities used in the other tables in the paper (Table 1.3). The nonlocal lending
shock measures the exposure of counties to lender shocks as defined in equation 1.2. Observa-
tions weighted by the number of employed workers in 2006. Standard errors clustered at the
division level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 1.15: Elasticity Estimates with Additional Controls
Dependent variables 2007-2010:
∆ Permits ∆ Constr. Emp ∆ Total Emp ∆ Other Emp ∆ Nontr. Emp
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆ Mortgage
Credit 2007-2010 1.031*** 0.541*** 0.126*** 0.046 0.028
(0.16) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.32 0.38
First stage F stat 22.25 24.70 24.21 23.70 23.06
Observations 951 1001 1027 1027 1025
This table shows the effects of changes in mortgage credit over 2007-2010, when instrumented
using the nonlocal lending shock, on local outcomes. These regressions include squared and
cubed terms for household debt-to-income, the local fraction of subprime borrowers, and the
runup in home prices over 2003-2006. All equations include region fixed effects and all other
observed characteristics of localities used in the other tables in the paper (Table 1.3). The
nonlocal lending shock measures the exposure of counties to lender shocks as defined in equa-
tion 1.2. Observations weighted by the number of employed workers in 2006. Standard errors
clustered at the division level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively.
Table 1.16: Elasticity Estimates Including Changes in Small Business Lending
(CRA)
Dependent variables 2007-2010:
∆ Permits ∆ Constr. Emp ∆ Total Emp ∆ Other Emp ∆ Nontr. Emp
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
∆ Mortgage
Credit 2007-2010 1.037*** 0.516*** 0.111*** 0.033 0.030
(0.17) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.48 0.64 0.47 0.31 0.36
First stage F stat 39.75 41.11 41.62 40.64 39.47
Observations 951 1001 1027 1027 1025
This table shows the effects of changes in mortgage credit over 2007-2010, when instrumented
using the nonlocal lending shock, on local outcomes. I include changes in small business lend-
ing over 2007-2010 obtained from the Community Reinvestment Act. All equations include
region fixed effects and all other observed characteristics of localities used in the other tables
in the paper (Table 1.3). The nonlocal lending shock measures the exposure of counties to
lender shocks as defined in equation 1.2. Observations weighted by the number of employed
workers in 2006. Standard errors clustered at the division level. *, **, and *** indicate sig-
nificance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Chapter 2
Property Investors and the
Housing Boom and Bust
2.1 Introduction
This paper argues that real estate investors – existing homeowners acquiring
additional properties – played a prominent role in generating the boom-bust
dynamics in economic activity observed over 2003-2010. The literature has al-
ready documented that investor activity was economically meaningful and far
from anecdotal during the housing boom. Bhutta (2015) finds that the contri-
bution of property investors to new mortgage debt in the mid 2000s exceeded in
both levels and growth rates that of first-time home buyers including subprime.
In fact, in the peak boom years of 2003-2006 when second and third-home buy-
ing flourished, the home ownership rate barely budged from 68.3 to 68.8 percent.
Investors might have helped precipitate the bust, too. After controlling for var-
ious loan characteristics, Haughwout et al. (2011) find that property investors
were more likely to default over 2007-2010.
The main contribution of this paper is to quantify the extent to which in-
vestor activity contributed to the run-up and subsequent decline in mortgage
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credit, home prices, and employment on a broad subset of local economies.
This contributes to the lively debate on the drivers of the housing boom. It
is broadly agreed that subprime and low-income borrowers levered up in the
boom (Mian and Sufi 2009; Demyanyk and Hemert 2011; Gerardi, Shapiro, and
Willen 2008). Growing evidence finds that prime and higher-income borrowers
also contributed to the run-up in household debt (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino
2016; Foote, Loewenstein, and Willen 2016; Albanesi, Giorgi, and Nosal 2017).
The findings here contribute to that evidence by emphasizing the relatively
unexplored role played by property investors.1
Increases in investor activity in the boom years could have led to increases
in housing demand, and thereby increases in home prices and construction.
In the bust, the effects could have turned contractionary. Property investors
were highly levered and experienced higher default rates in the recession than
first time homeowners (Haughwout et al. 2011; Bayer et al. 2011). Moreover,
excessive home building would have led to inefficient land use in the recession
difficult to overcome due to irreversibility constraints (Boldrin et al. 2016).
The main identification challenge is of reverse causality – surging investor
activity could have driven home price appreciation, but it is also plausible that
expected home price appreciation drove investor activity. I measure investor
activity at the county level as the share of mortgage originations for non owner-
occupied housing from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset.
My baseline measure is taken over 1998-2000, so it significantly predates the
1Financial developments have also been linked to the run-up in household debt and home
prices in the U.S. such as the rise in alternative mortgages (Barlevy and Fisher 2012; Foote
et al. 2008), securitization (Keys et al. 2010; Nadauld and Sherlund 2009; Garćıa 2017),
and demand for mortgage derivatives from Europe (Shin 2012; Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti 2013).
peak years of the housing boom. It is therefore unlikely that the cross-sectional
variation in the investor shares is driven by variation in expectations about home
price appreciation. In fact, the results in the paper are robust to measuring
investor activity in earlier periods such as the mid 90s.
While the investor shares are measured during the pre-boom years 1998-
2000, they are an excellent predictor of cross-sectional variation in investor
shares in the peak boom years. The reason is that counties with high investor
activity have fixed appealing physical qualities, such as warm winters and a wa-
terfront, as measured from the Department of Agriculture’s Natural Amenities
Scale. Top counties include several locations in Florida as well as the home
counties of Myrtle Beach, SC, Mohave, AZ. and Maui, HI. Because of these
fixed qualities, the cross-sectional variation in investor activity at the county
level is highly persistent. The cross-sectional correlation is 0.88 of investor ac-
tivity over 1998-2000 with activity measured over 2004-2006.2 Investor activity
is also highly correlated (0.83) with the share of vacation homes in a county,
obtained from the 2000 Decennial Census. The vacation share is based on the
stock of housing, and is therefore not likely influenced by short to medium-run
changes in home price appreciation expectations.
Investor activity in HMDA includes buyers of vacation homes as well as
‘flippers’, since HMDA only distinguishes between households intending to use
a property as “owner-occupied as a principal dwelling” or not. The coverage of
both types is likely high in HMDA, because the majority of both second-home
2The correlation coefficient is 0.95 between investor activity in 1994-1996 and 1998-2010.
buyers as well as professional investors with multiple properties used mort-
gages in the boom.3 Reflecting the high coverage of both types, the investor
shares (over 1998-2000) are highly correlated with both the 2000 Census vaca-
tion shares, as well as measurements of speculative activity in the peak boom
years. Using proprietary data on home flips – a flip is defined as the second
sale of a residence within a one-year period – I find that property flip rates were
higher in the peak boom years (and increased by more) in counties with high
investor shares.4
To estimate the effects of investor activity on home prices and employment,
I model the cross-sectional variation in county-level investor shares over 1998-
2000 as fixed, but with potential-time varying effects from the interaction of
the investor shares with year dummies. That allows for investor shares to be
associated positively with higher home prices in the mid 2000s, and with lower
home prices later in the decade, for example. The full model includes county
and year fixed effects, as well as the interaction of a detailed set of county
characteristics with year dummies. The results are robust, for instance, to
controlling for the interaction of the ? housing supply elasticity with year
dummies, and so shed new light on the drivers of the housing boom and bust.
In counties with above-average investor shares, mortgage originations, home
3Mills, Molloy, and Zarutskie (2017) find that 68 percent of ‘investor’ households used
mortgages to finance home purchases over 2004-2006 based on a CoreLogic dataset of county
property tax assessors’ records. Investors are defined as households owning three or more
properties with an adjustment to distinguish from wealthy individuals that own multiple
homes for personal use. This was provided upon request by Mills, Molloy, and Zarutskie
(2017), who in the paper report analogous data for 2012-2014.
4The correlations between investor shares and flip rates and the change in flip rates are
0.52 and 0.43, respectively.
prices, and employment grew faster over 2003-2006. Counties with a 10 percent-
age point higher investor share (over 1998-2000), for instance, experienced on
average close to 9.5 percentage point higher construction employment in 2006,
with 6.5 of those percentage points explained by faster growth over 2003-2006.
Higher investor shares are also associated with higher and growing levels of
home prices and mortgage credit during that period.
The positive association begins to reverse in 2007. Over the next few years,
counties with high investor shares over 1998-2000 crashed harder. By 2010,
high investor shares were now negatively associated with lower credit issuance,
home prices, and employment. In 2010, counties with a 10 percentage point
higher investor share (over 1998-2000) had on average 7 percent lower construc-
tion employment. The dramatic reversal in the Great Recession years shows
that ‘investor counties’ experienced a more pronounced boom, and a more pro-
nounced bust.
I then attempt to quantify an answer to the question, how different would
home prices and employment dynamics have been over 2003-2010, in the absence
of property investment? I do so by comparing the evolution of home prices and
employment against a counterfactual in which the rise in cross-sectional varia-
tion in investor shares does not help explain variation in the time series of the
dependent variables (such as construction employment). Specifically, I com-
pute fitted values from a full regression model for each dependent variable, and
compare those fitted values against the counterfactual in which the coefficients
are set to zero (while holding everything else constant) for the interactions of
investor shares with year dummies.
In the counterfactual, mortgage credit, home prices, and construction em-
ployment grow less in the boom, and land more softly in the bust. The boom
and bust are still there, reflecting the fact that other factors were important
drivers, but the paths would have been smoother, particularly for construction
and financial employment, where real estate intermediaries make up about a
third of employees. Almost 30 percent of the rise over 2003-2006 and fall over
2007-2010 in construction and financial employment can be explained by prop-
erty investment. For other employment categories (total private employment
excluding construction and finance), the effects are less symmetric. Property
investment is associated with a small rise in other employment in the boom
years, though it can explain about a third of the employment losses in the bust.
This is in line with the investment overhang hypothesis, where excessive home
building in the boom creates asymmetric gains and losses in other sectors. In
Boldrin et al. (2016) irreversibility constraints imply housing structures cannot
be put to use by more productive industries. The zero lower bound could have
also hindered the reallocation of resources to nonresidential sectors (Rognlie,
Shleifer, and Simsek (Forthcoming)).
The identifying assumption is that the 1998-2000 investor shares are uncorre-
lated with unobserved characteristics of counties affecting boom-bust dynamics.
Because high investor counties have high amenity values, these counties might
be systematically different in ways that are correlated with boom-bust dynam-
ics. To address that concern, I control for the interaction of a detailed set of
county characteristics and year dummies. Moreover, I perform a useful bound-
ing exercise by ‘over-controlling’ using the 2006 median ratio of household debt
to income from Mian and Sufi (2014). This proxies for any unobserved local
shocks that led to higher local household debt levels. I interpret these estimates
as lower-bound, since controlling for 2006 debt to income also controls for local
property investments made by locals (but not out-of-towners). When doing so,
the qualitative results all hold, with the quantitative effects of property invest-
ment being about 30 percent smaller.
The evidence in this paper is in line with theories of the housing boom
emphasizing the role played by property investors. In the housing search model
of Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), it only takes a few households turning bullish
to generate a housing boom. Optimists can influence prices because the volume
of transactions with respect to the housing stock is relatively low.5 The boom-
bust can be protracted and deeper if bullish households find new converts, as
in the search and social dynamics model of Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2016).6 Short-term investment was indeed sizable, with sales of homes held for
less than 3 years accounting for 42 percent of the growth in sales volume from
2000-2005 (DeFusco, Nathanson, and Zwick 2017).7
The main contribution of this paper is to quantify the effects of the boom and
bust in property investment on economic activity over 2003-2010. This builds
on previous work documenting the substantial role played by property investors
in explaining the run-up in household debt, such as Haughwout et al. (2011)
and Bhutta (2015) which are based on the location of the investor (Equifax)
5Only 6 percent of owner-occupied homes traded every year according to the American
Housing Survey. In contrast, on the New York Stock Exchange, the ratio of annual volume
to market capitalization is 120 percent (Piazzesi and Schneider (2009)).
6More than 10 TV shows were dedicated to home flipping in the mid 2000s, including Flip
This House, Flip That House, and My House is Worth What?
7In the HMDA data, the number of loans for non owner-occupied properties increased
by 63 percent from 2003-2006, compared with only 15 percent increase for owner-occupied
mortgages.
rather than the investment. The HMDA data, in contrast, is based on the
location of the property. Other related work includes Chinco and Mayer (2016);
Gao, Sockin, and Xiong (2017); Nieuwerburgh and Favilukis (2017); Bayer et al.
(2011). Using a high-frequency identification approach in a panel VAR, Chinco
and Mayer (2016) find that positive shocks to investor activity led to higher
home prices in the boom. They also find that out-of-town investors were less
informed than locals. Their monthly transactions-level data is very detailed,
but is only available for 21 MSAs. The greater geographic coverage of the
HMDA data allows me to document new cross-sectional facts about investor
activity such as the the close relation between HMDA investor shares, vacation
shares, and flip rates. Gao, Sockin, and Xiong (2017) use state-level variation
in capital gains taxes to instrument for investor activity, and also find that
investor activity in the boom years is associated with declines in home prices
and employment in the Great Recession. Nieuwerburgh and Favilukis (2017)
solve a spatial equilibrium model of a city and find that an influx of out-of-
town real estate buyers can push up construction employment and home prices,
benefiting local home owners and hurting renters.8
2.2 Motivation
Investor counties – locations which tend to be the recipients of second home
buying – experienced boom-bust dynamics in economic activity over 2003-2010.
8Other related work includes the growing quantitative literature assessing the extent to
which different shocks can account for the stylized facts in the housing boom, such as the
increase in home prices and the home-ownership rate from 2000-2005 (Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti 2015; Garriga, Manuelli, and Peralta-Alva 2012; Boldrin et al. 2016). ? find
that improved expectations of home price appreciation are necessary to explain the run-up in
home prices; increases in credit supply alone do not, if they only encourage renters to become
home-owners rather than buy more housing.
I measure the investor share in a county as the fraction of non owner-occupied
mortgages issued in the pre-boom years of 1998-2000 from HMDA. I then divide
counties into three groups: the top quartile by investor activity, the middle
quartiles, and the bottom quartile. Figure 2.1 plots the average level of home
prices and construction employment for each of these groups. The data are in
log levels and have been indexed such that the log levels equal one in the year
2000. The figure shows that the 3 groups exhibit common trends until about
2003; from 2003-2006 investor counties experience a boom; and from 2007-2010
investor counties experience a sharp contraction. By 2010, the groups roughly
seem to be trending similarly again.
As further motivation, I show that counties with high investor shares (1998-
2000) were more likely to experience a housing boom over 2003-2006. I compute
the historical mean and standard deviation for annual growth in home prices
for each county using the FHFA Home Price Index, which is available back to
the 1980s for most of all the largest 500 counties in the country. I define the
county-level indicator Boomi as equal to 1 if yearly growth rates between 2003-
2006 exceeded twice the standard deviation of growth rates plus the historical
mean. Of the largest 500 counties, close to 20 percent of counties fit the bill as
having experienced a housing boom.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.1 provide coefficient estimates of the following
probit model:
P pBoomi  1q  Φpα0   α1InvestorSharei,9800   α2Xi,2000   υiq
where Boomi is an indicator variable for whether county i experienced a home











































All series are in log levels with the value in year 2000 set to 1. Counties are divided
into quartiles by the share of real estate investor activity, measured over 1998-2000.
Source: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, and Zillow Home Price Index
price boom; the main explanatory variable of interest is the investor share mea-
sured over 1998-2000; Xi are other county characteristics in 2000 obtained from
the Census: median income and home values in dollars, the fraction of college-
educated, senior citizens, white, poor, housing units with an outstanding mort-
gage, and home values exceeding the conforming loan limit; and υi is an error
term. The investor share is standardized and Table 2.1 reports marginal ef-
fects when holding all explanatory variables constant at their means. Therefore
the Table coefficients have the interpretation of the increase in the likelihood
of a county experiencing a housing boom over 2003-2006 from having an in-
vestor share one standard deviation above the mean. Errors are clustered at
the state-level to allow for arbitrary correlation of shocks within states.
Table 2.1: The Effect of Investor Activity on the Likelihood of Experiencing a Housing
Boom
Probit ∆Home Price 2003-2006
Investor Share 1998-2000 .074 .085 .281 .353
(.044) (.035) (.112) (.098)
Other Controls No Yes No Yes
ErBooms .18 .18
ErBoom : InvShareP90  InvShareP10s .13 .14
Observations 497 497 497 497
The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is an indicator for whether the county experienced a
boom in home prices over 2003-2006, as defined as in text. The Investor Share is the fraction
of non owner-occupied mortgages for home purchase over 1998-2000. The dependent variable in
Columns 3-4 is percent change in home prices over 2003-2006. Columns 2 and 4 contain a full
set of county characteristics in 2000 obtained from the Census: median income and home values
in dollars, the fraction of college-educated, senior citizens, white, poor, housing units with an
outstanding mortgage, and home values exceeding the conforming loan limit. Columns 1 and
2 report marginal coefficients from probit evaluated at the mean of all explanatory variables.
Columns 3 and 4 report OLS coefficients. All standard errors clustered by state.
The coefficient on the investor share indicates that counties with higher in-
vestor activity were more likely to experience a housing boom over 2003-2006.
Column 1 provides results from the bivariate specification while Column 2 in-
cludes the full set of pre-boom county controls. With the full set of controls,
a 1 standard deviation increase in the investor share is associated with an 8.5
percentage point increase in the likelihood of a county experiencing a hous-
ing boom. For a county in the 10th percentile of the distribution of investor
share, the likelihood of having a housing boom is 9 percent, holding all other
variables constant at their means. When changing the investor share to the
90th percentile, the likelihood increases by 14 percentage points to 23 percent
– a greater than doubling in the likelihood of experiencing a boom episode. In
Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the percent change in home prices
over 2003-2006, and the models are estimated via OLS. The coefficient on the
investor share is positive and significant providing complementary evidence that
investor counties experienced faster growth in home prices.
The rest of the paper discusses the data used in the paper (Section 2.3)
and documents investor counties experienced higher speculative activity (flip
rates) in the boom years. Section 2.4 shows the increase in speculation was
accompanied by a boom and bust in labor and housing markets. Moreover, the
documented boom-bust dynamics are associated specifically with cross-sectional
variation in investor activity, and not other dimensions previously explored in
the literature such as the housing supply elasticity ? or household leverage
(Mian and Sufi (2014)).
2.3 The Geography of Property Investment
The cross-sectional variation in property investment is to a large extent driven
by variation in the physical appeal of locations. Because these qualities are
mostly fixed, the investor shares are highly correlated year-on-year. There is
significant cross-sectional variation in investor activity (measured over 1998-
2000), with the bottom 10 percent of counties having less than 4.3 percent
investor shares, and the top 10 percent with over 16.3 percent shares of investor
activity. Counties with high investor shares are located in areas with appealing
features such as a waterfront. Examples include various counties in FL, and the
home counties of Myrtle Beach, SC, Mohave, AZ. and Maui, HI.
I measure investor shares over 1998-2000 to avoid the potential reverse
causality concern that cross-sectional variation in expected home appreciation
in the boom years drove the geographic variation in property investment.9 As
evidence that the physical qualities of locations mostly explain cross-sectional
variation in investor activity, Figure 2.2 shows that investor shares (over 1998-
2000) are highly correlated with the share of vacation homes in a county. The
correlation coefficient is 0.83, and the vacation shares are obtained from the
2000 Decennial Census. The vacation share measure is based on the stock of
housing and so are not likely to be influenced by any recent trends.
Investor shares over 1998-2000 are an excellent predictor of investor shares in
the peak boom years of 2004-2006 (and other periods as well). Figure 2.3 shows
the correlation between investor shares measured over 1998-2000 and 2004-2006
is 0.88. The correlation is also close to one for other periods. Counties with
high investor shares tend to have appealing physical qualities, such as warm and
sunny winters, as well as proximity to water. The Natural Amenities dataset of
the Department of Agriculture compiles six measures of the physical qualities
of locations – temperatures in January and July, hours of sunlight in January,
humidity in July, a topographic measure ranging from plains to mountains, and
the fraction of water area in a county. These characteristics explain between 20
and 40 percent of the cross-sectional variation in investor shares over 1998-2000
9Measuring the investor share at an earlier period such as 1994-1996 leads to nearly iden-
tical results, with the correlation coefficient equal to 0.95.
and 2004-2006, as shown in Table 2.2. This is particularly true for the very top
investor counties, which essentially all have a sizable waterfront.
Figure 2.2: Vacation Counties
Figure plots the share of vacation homes in the 2000 Decennial Census versus investor shares in
2000-2003. Observations weighted by the number of home sales in 2005-2006.
Investor activity in HMDA would include different types of investors, such
as buyers of vacation homes, rental properties, and flips, since HMDA only dis-
tinguishes between households intending to use a property as “owner-occupied
as a principal dwelling” or not. Coverage depends on the extent to which dif-
ferent investor types use mortgages. Coverage is likely reasonably high for all
of the investor types, with some variation. Mills, Molloy, and Zarutskie (2017)
document the extent to which different buyer types tend to use mortgages when
buying homes, using CoreLogic data on property transactions and county prop-
erty tax assessors’ records. About 85 percent of non-investor households used
mortgages to finance home purchases in 2004-2006. This group would be most
associated with buyers of second homes (such as vacation homes), and so are
Table 2.2: Investor Shares and Natural Amenities
Investor Share 2004 2006 Investor Share 1998 2000
Coef./SE Coef./SE
Temperature in January 0.38** 0.30***
(0.15) (0.10)
Water Area 0.18** 0.18**
(0.07) (0.07)
Temperature in July 0.16 -0.01
(0.14) (0.12)
Hours of Sunlight in January 0.09 0.11
(0.11) (0.09)





# Counties 418 418
The dependent variables are the county-level investor shares, over 2004-2006 in Column 1,
and 1998-2000 in Column 2. The explanatory variables are physical characteristics of locali-
ties obtained from the Department of Agriculture’s Natural Amenities dataset. All variables
are standardized. Observations are weighted by the number of home sales in 2005-2006.
Figure 2.3: Stable Classification of Investor Counties
Source: HMDA. Figure plots investor shares in 2005-2006 against investor shares in 2000-2003.
Observations weighted by the number of home sales in 2005-2006.
likely the best represented in the HMDA data. The analogous statistic is also
high for ‘investors’ – about 68 percent of home-purchases for this category where
mortgage-financed. Investors in Mills, Molloy, and Zarutskie (2017) are defined
as households owning three or more properties with an adjustment to distinguish
from wealthy individuals that own multiple homes for personal use.10
Consistent with HMDA coverage of potential flippers being reasonably high,
the investor share (over 1998-2000) is positively associated with measures of
speculative activity in the peak boom years. I obtain flip rate data from Realy-
Trac – a flip is defined as a second sale of a residence within a one-year period.
The flip rate is the total number of flips in a county in a given year divided by
the total number of home sales, and the data are based on public deed records.
10Mills, Molloy, and Zarutskie (2017) document that in the recovery period (2012-2014)
property investments are now less household and mortgage-driven, with corporate investors
accounting for a larger share of property investment.
Three years of data were acquired for 2001, 2005, and 2006.
Counties with a 10 percent higher share of investor activity experienced on
average 2.7 percentage point higher flip rates over 2005-2006 (Figure 2.4). Flip
rates also increased more in investor counties. A 10 percent higher share of
investor activity is associated with a 2.2 percentage point increase in flip rates
between 2001 and 2005-2006 (Figure 2.5). The correlations of investor activity
over 1998-2000 and flip rates over 2005-2006 and the change in flip rates are
0.53 and 0.42, respectively.
Figure 2.4: Flip Rates vs Investor Activity
Source: RealtyTrac. Figure plots flip rates in 2005-2006 against investor shares in
1998-2000. Observations weighted by the number of home sales in 2005-2006. Data
available for 418 of the 500 largest counties.
Figure 2.5: Change in Flip Rates vs Investor Activity
Source: RealtyTrac. Figure plots the increase in flip rates from 2001 to 2005-2006
against investor shares in 1998-2000. Observations weighted by the number of home
sales in 2005-2006. Data available for 269 of the 500 largest counties.
There was under-reporting of investment activity in the HMDA dataset in
the time series, though this is not likely to be a major concern for the pre-
boom cross-sectional measurement of investor activity. All else equal, primary
residence mortgages tend to have more favorable loan terms, while sales of
primary residences are taxed at lower rates. Partly because of that, owner-
occupancy was under-reported particularly in the peak boom years (Elul and
Tilson 2015, Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin 2015, Mian and Sufi 2015). To the
extent that the loosening of documentation standards enabled misreporting in
the peak boom years, measurement error is likely to be less of an issue before
the 2000s. The main measurement of investor activity used in this paper is
over 1998-2000, and is cross-sectional, so measurement concerns are likely to be
minor. As evidence for that, the investor activity measure is highly correlated
with related county-level indicators obtained from independent datasets. For
instance, the correlation coefficient is 0.83 between investor shares and the share
of vacation homes from the Census.
2.4 Investor Activity and Boom-Bust Dynam-
ics
Property investment surged in the peak boom years 2003-2006. I hypothe-
size that this surge in property investment had a stronger effect on counties
which traditionally were the recipients of investor activity. I model the cross-
sectional variation in investor shares as fixed and with potential time-varying
effects through the interaction of county-specific investor shares with year dum-
mies. To the extent that the investor shares measured over 1998-2000 are not
systematically associated with other, unobserved local factors explaining boom-
bust dynamics, the interactions will reveal the effects of investor activity on local
economic activity. Specifically, I estimate the following fixed effects model:
Y jit  αi   τt   βtpInvestor Sharei  τtq   φtpZi  τtq   εit (2.1)
for counties i and years t. The dependent variables Y jit are in log-levels and
include (indexed by j) the flow of new mortgage credit (originations), home
prices, construction employment, financial employment, and ‘other’ employment
defined as total private minus construction and financial employment. Each
model is estimated separately. The specification includes a full set of county αi
and year fixed effects τt. Data for mortgage originations, employment categories,
and home prices come from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages, and Zillow Research. All series run from
1994 to 2015 with the exception of the Zillow home price index which starts in
1996.
The parameters of interest are βt – differences in the level of the dependent
variable explained by variation in the investor share on a year-specific basis.
The effects are allowed to vary by year over the 2003-2012 period, in order to
investigate trends. For example, having a high investor share could be associ-
ated with higher home prices in the mid 2000s, but lower home prices in late
2000s. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level to account for serial
correlation in the residuals. The dependent variables are in levels, to allow for
the explanatory variables having potentially persistent effects on the level of
economic activity. The qualitative conclusions are the same when estimating in
first differences or with lags, as shown in the Robustness section.
One concern is that variation in the investor shares is correlated with other
characteristics of localities, which may themselves be associated with boom-bust
dynamics. For example, investor counties tend to be lower income. To ensure
that β capture only the effects of variation in investor activity, I control for
the interaction of year dummies with other cross-sectional local characteristics
Zi all measured in a pre-boom period, such as median home values, household
income, the fraction of the population that is college-educated, poor, have an
open mortgage, identify as white, are 55 years old or older, live in an urban area
(all obtained from the 2000 Decennial Census), and the manufacturing share of
employment in 2000 from the QCEW. I also control for pre-boom trends in
the performance of local economies, specifically, the growth in home prices,
construction employment, and other employment over 1998 and 2003.11 These
pre-boom characteristics are also interacted with the year dummies.
Table 2.3 shows results for the baseline specification. Mortgage originations,
home prices, and employment grew faster in investor counties over 2003-2006.
For example, counties with a 10 percentage point higher investor share experi-
enced on average close to 9.5 percentage point higher construction employment
in 2006, with 6.3 of those percentage points explained by faster growth over
2003-2006. Across models, higher investor shares are associated with higher
and growing levels of economic activity during that period.
The positive association begins to reverse in 2007. Over the next few years,
11The results are also robust to controlling for the housing supply elasticity of Saiz (2010),
though that measure is available only for a smaller sample of counties. The R-squared in
a population-weighted (unweighted) regression of the elasticity against the investor share is
0.002 (0.004).
investor counties crashed more deeply. By 2010, high investor shares were then
negatively associated with lower credit issuance, home prices, and employment.
In 2010, counties with a 10 percentage point higher investor share had on average
6.8 percent lower construction employment. The dramatic reversal in the Great
Recession years shows that investor counties experienced a more pronounced
boom, and a more pronounced bust.
The identifying assumption is that the 1998-2000 investor shares are uncorre-
lated with unobserved characteristics of counties affecting boom-bust dynamics.
For example, unobserved productivity shocks could be correlated with the in-
vestor shares. In the absence of a direct measure of local productivity shocks,
I control for cross-sectional variation in median household debt to income in
2006. Local positive productivity shocks perceived to be permanent would in-
duce households in the county to lever up. Mian and Sufi (2011) have docu-
mented that median household debt to income in 2006 is an excellent predictor
of boom-bust dynamics.
The measure of household debt to income, based on the New York Fed’s
Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, is comprehensive and local – it includes mort-
gages as well as other household debt such as auto loans, and is based on the
primary residence of the households. The run-up in household debt incurred by
local investors buying local properties would be captured in the debt-to-income
measure. Therefore, including debt to income as a regressor would amount to
over-controlling in the sense that it would also partly capture local second-home
investment. This is helpful for identification purposes, but could lead to under-
estimates, since the estimates would reflect only property investment driven by
Table 2.3: Investor Activty and Boom-Bust Dynamics
Dependent variables:
Originationsit Home Pricesit Constr. Empit Fin. Empit Other Empit
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
β2003 0.73*** 0.21** 0.32*** 0.05 0.06**
(0.14) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03)
β2004 1.06*** 0.22** 0.51*** 0.11* 0.07**
(0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03)
β2005 1.30*** 0.59*** 0.85*** 0.20*** 0.10***
(0.20) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.03)
β2006 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.94*** 0.24*** 0.13***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.13) (0.09) (0.04)
β2007 -0.09 0.37** 0.73*** 0.25*** 0.09**
(0.19) (0.16) (0.12) (0.09) (0.04)
β2008 -0.76*** 0.02 0.12 0.14 -0.01
(0.20) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.04)
β2009 -0.88*** -0.39*** -0.45*** -0.04 -0.13***
(0.20) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.05)
β2010 -0.86*** -0.72*** -0.69*** -0.04 -0.16***
(0.20) (0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.06)
β2011 -0.67*** -0.92*** -0.88*** -0.09 -0.15**
(0.20) (0.19) (0.15) (0.12) (0.06)
β2012 -0.60*** -0.85*** -0.88*** -0.12 -0.14**
(0.19) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13) (0.06)
County, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.78 0.83 0.59 0.35 0.56
# Observations 17283 10320 17864 18106 18084
# Counties 823 516 812 823 822
The table reports estimates based on the model
Y jit  αi   τt   βtpInvestor Sharei  τtq   φtpZi  τtq   εit
where βt is the coefficient associated with the interaction of the investor share over 1998-2000
and a year t dummy variable Regressions include county fixed effects and time fixed effects
for the sample of largest counties for which data is available. Additional controls include the
interaction of year dummies with county characteristics Zi: 2000 median home values, house-
hold income, the fraction of the population that is college-educated, poor, have an open mort-
gage, identify as white, are 55 years old or older, live in an urban area, and the manufacturing
share of employment in 2000 from the QCEW. Standard errors clustered at the county-level.
out-of-town investors. Therefore, I interpret the coefficient estimates, when con-
trolling for cross-sectional variation in household debt to income, as providing
a lower bound.
Table 2.4 shows results for the specification that controls for household debt
to income. The qualitative patterns are the same. Investor counties grew faster
in the boom years, and crashed harder in the years of the Great Recession. The
magnitudes of the boom and bust explained by investor activity are smaller than
in the baseline case, as would be expected, since local property investments
in the boom years made by locals would be captured in the debt-to-income
measure. Because the qualitative results still hold, and the magnitudes are
comparable, this suggests that out-of-town investors accounted for a large share
of the investments.
2.4.1 Aggregate Implications
How different would home price and employment dynamics been over 2003-
2012 in the absence of property speculation? This section attempts to provide
an answer. Specifically, I compare the evolution of home prices and employment
against a counterfactual in which cross-sectional variation in investor activity is
not helpful in explaining time-series variation.
Denote xY jit as the fitted values of equation 2.1 – the fitted values from the
full model of dependent variable j for county i and year t:
xY jit  pαi   pτt   pβtpInvestor Sharei  τtq   pφtpZi  τtq (2.2)
These fitted values contrast with the counterfactual {Y j,CFit where, all else equal,
cross-sectional variation in investor activity does not help explain dynamics in
Table 2.4: Investor Activity and Boom-Bust Dynamics – Controlling for Cross-
Sectional Variation in 2006 Household Debt to Income
Dependent variables:
Originationsit Home Pricesit Constr. Empit Fin. Empit Other Empit
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
β2003 0.44*** 0.05 0.18*** -0.08 0.02
(0.13) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03)
β2004 0.72*** 0.02 0.24*** 0.02 0.03
(0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03)
β2005 0.89*** 0.24* 0.48*** 0.12 0.05*
(0.21) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03)
β2006 0.60*** 0.25 0.51*** 0.16* 0.07*
(0.23) (0.19) (0.14) (0.10) (0.04)
β2007 0.36* 0.05 0.44*** 0.21** 0.04
(0.19) (0.17) (0.11) (0.10) (0.04)
β2008 -0.33 -0.07 0.09 0.20* -0.01
(0.21) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.05)
β2009 -0.77*** -0.28* -0.19 0.07 -0.07
(0.21) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.05)
β2010 -0.67*** -0.55*** -0.34** 0.15 -0.06
(0.20) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12) (0.05)
β2011 -0.55*** -0.53*** -0.53*** 0.11 -0.04
(0.21) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.06)
β2012 -0.47** -0.47*** -0.53*** 0.06 -0.03
(0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.06)
County, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2006 Debt to Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.78 0.84 0.60 0.35 0.56
# Observations 17283 10320 17864 18106 18084
# Counties 823 516 812 823 822
The table reports estimates based on the model
Y jit  αi   τt   βtpInvestor Sharei  τtq   φtpZi  τtq   εit
where βt is the coefficient associated with the interaction of the investor share over 1998-2000
and a year t dummy variable. Regressions include county fixed effects and time fixed effects
for the sample of largest counties for which data is available. Additional controls include the
interaction of year dummies with county characteristics Zi: 2006 median household debt to
income, 2000 median home values, household income, the fraction of the population that is
college-educated, poor, have an open mortgage, identify as white, are 55 years old or older,
live in an urban area, and the manufacturing share of employment in 2000 from the QCEW.
Standard errors clustered at the county-level.
the dependent variable – specifically, where pβt  0 for all years between 2003-
2012.
{Y j,CFit  pαi   pτt   pφtpZi  τtq  xY jit  pβtpInvestor Sharei  τtq (2.3)
Figure 2.6 provides a visual comparison of the evolution of aggregate home
prices, construction, financial, and other employment for the fitted values of
the full model (equation 2.2), against the counterfactual in which pβt  0 from
equation 2.3. Each county-specific series is rescaled to equal 1 in the year
2000. The aggregate series are then obtained by taking the population-weighted
average across counties. The aggregate version of the data and the fitted values
from the model are almost indistinguishable, so the figure only includes the
fitted values in addition to the counterfactual.
In the counterfactual economic activity grew more slowly in the boom, and
declines less precipitously in the bust. This shows that home prices and em-
ployment (especially in construction and finance) would have been less volatile
in the absence of the rise and collapse in speculative investment. That said, the
dynamics in the fitted values of the full model and the counterfactual are fairly
similar, with economic activity growing over 2003-2006, and contracting in the
following years, reflecting the fact that other factors other than the property
investment explain the majority of boom-bust dynamics.
I define the percent variation explained by investor activity as the difference
between the changes in the fitted values of the full model and the changes in the
counterfactual, relative to the observed changes in the data. In particular, let
∆Y jboom,∆
zY jboom, {∆Y j,CFboom stand for the change in the observed data, fitted values,
and counterfactual, respectively, for dependent variable j over 2003-2006. The
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Figure plots fitted values based on equation 2.2 against a counterfactual in which
variation in investor shares does not help explain growth in the boom or the collapse
in the bust for each dependent variable (equation 2.3).
percent variation explained by investor activity for dependent variable j over
2003-2006 is given by
{∆Y jboom  {∆Y j,CFboom
∆Y jboom
(2.4)
with an analogous definition for the bust period of 2007-2010.
Table 2.5 quantifies the extent to which investor activity explains variation
in home prices, construction, financial, and other employment in the boom
and bust periods. Two sets of estimates are provided: first, for the baseline
Table 2.5: Percent of Observed Changes in Economic Activity Explained by Investor
Activity
Construction Emp Home Price Index Financial Emp Other Emp
Baseline estimates
2003-2006: 36.95 10.40 20.28 8.14
2007-2010: 29.51 36.11 15.79 35.70
Lower-bound estimates: Controlling for variation in 2006 household debt to income
2003-2006: 20.02 4.75 29.95 6.85
2007-2010: 16.00 18.57 2.7 14.37
This table computes the percent of the observed changes in each outcome variable (home
price index and construction, financial, and other (total private excluding construction and
finance) employment) during the boom (2003-2006) and bust (2007-2010) periods explained
by investor activity, as defined in the text (see equation 2.4). The lower-bound estimates are
obtained when controlling for 2006 household debt to income.
specification (equation 2.1), and second, the lower-bound estimates from the
specification which controls for cross-sectional variation in 2006 household debt
to income. The latter are lower-bound estimates, since variation in 2006 debt
to income would control for variation in the extent to which locals engaged in
local property investment. Chinco and Mayer (2016) find that local investors
accounted for about about two-thirds of second-home buying over 2000-2007,
though local prices were more sensitive to investments by out-of-towners.
Investor activity can explain a sizable fraction of the observed changes in
economic activity in the boom and bust, particularly for construction and fi-
nancial employment. The surge in property investment would stimulate new
construction as well as demand for financial intermediaries such as real estate
agents. In the baseline specification, investor activity can explain between 37
and 21 percent of the variation in construction and financial employment in the
boom years (2003-2006), and 30 and 16 percent of the variation in the bust
years (2007-2010).
The variation in other employment (total private minus construction and
finance) explained by investor activity is much smaller, particularly in the boom
(about 7 percent). This suggests that, at least in the boom, the employment
gains generated by the surge in property investment were largely concentrated
in construction and finance. In the bust, property investment can explain a
larger share of the job losses in other employment – between 16 and 36 percent.
The picture is similar for home prices, with investor activity accounting for a
modest fraction of the change in home prices in the run-up, but a larger fraction
in the bust, between 14 (lower-end) and 36 (baseline) percent.
For other employment, which accounts for about 85 percent of total em-
ployment, the losses associated with the property speculation in the bust years
were larger than the gains in the boom. The asymmetry is consistent with
the investment overhang hypothesis. That is consistent with the quantitative
housing model of Boldrin et al. (2016) in which to irreversibility constraints on
housing structures help explain employment losses in the bust. Housing struc-
tures cannot be put to use in other sectors where the marginal productivity
of land is higher. In Rognlie, Shleifer, and Simsek (Forthcoming) misalloca-
tions are caused by the Zero Lower Bound, which places a cap on nonresidential
investment and consumption.
2.4.2 Robustness
The identifying assumption is that the 1998-2000 investor shares are uncorre-
lated with unobserved characteristics of counties affecting boom-bust dynamics.
In particular, it is possible that the investor shares measured over 1998-2000 are
partly driven by investors’ expectations about future home appreciation. The
1998-2000 period was chosen as a pre-boom period to avoid this concern, but it
is plausible that it is not early enough.
To check against those concerns, I proceed in two ways. First, the investor
share measured over an earlier period (1994-1996) is highly correlated (coeffi-
cient = 0.95) with the investor share measured over 1998-2000 (Figure 2.7). This
ameliorates concerns about the cross-sectional variation in investor shares being
driven by expected home appreciation. The correlation coefficient is 0.84 be-
tween the investor shares measured over 1994-1996 and 2004-2006 (not shown).
Figure 2.7: Stable Classification of Investor Counties
Source: HMDA. Figure plots investor shares in 1998-2000 against investor shares in 1994-1996.
Observations weighted by the number of home sales in 2005-2006.
Instead, the high correlation is likely driven by the fixed appealing physi-
cal qualities of localities. To see that more directly, I isolate variation in the
investor shares that is purely explained by observable physical characteristics,
from the Natural Amenities Dataset. Specifically, I run the following ‘first-
stage’ regression where Pi consists of the six variables in the Natural Amenities
Dataset, including their squared terms, and the investor share is measured over
1998-2000 as in the rest of the paper. The physical characteristics of localities
include measures of temperature, sunlight, topography, and water area.
Investor Sharei  γPi   υi
{Investor Sharei  pγPi
The correlation coefficient between these fitted values and the actual investor
shares measured over 1998-2000 and 2004-2006 are 0.43 and 0.49, respectively.
I then use the fitted values to repeat the main analysis of this paper.
Yit  αi   τt   βtp {Investor Sharei  τtq   φtpZi  τtq   εit (2.5)
When using the variation in the fitted values explained by the observed
physical characteristics of the localities, the results are very similar, as shown in
Table 2.6. Investor counties grew faster in the boom years, and crashed harder.
The coefficients are very similar to those in Table 2.3, after rescaling the fitted
values to match the standard deviation in the investor shares. More specifically,
using these estimates in the baseline case, variation in investor shares could
explain 32, 16, 27, and 17 percent of the run-up in construction employment,
home prices, financial employment, and other employment in the boom, and 13,
18, 10, and 11 percent of the decline, respectively, over 2007-2010.
In the baseline specification, the dependent variables are in log levels and do
not include lags of the dependent variable, to allow for investor activity having
potentially permanent effects. The benefit of estimating the models in first
differences is that doing so is robust to counties having different time trends.
When in first differences, the results are qualitatively very similar. Table 2.7
shows the coefficients associated with the interaction of investor shares and year
dummies for the model in first differences (growth rates), which are very similar
to the model in level including a lag of the dependent variable (not shown).
Economic activity associated with having higher investor shares peaked in
2005, the peak year of the boom. Growth in construction employment, home
prices, and financial employment associated with investor activity was highest
in 2005. Mortgage originations are a flow, so the peak in new economic activity
in 2005 is reflected as a higher growth the year before (between 2004 and 2005).
The effect of investor activity plateaued in the following year, with growth rates
in 2006 not statistically different from zero. Over the next years, investor ac-
tivity is associated with declining economic activity. The peak of the decline is
in 2008 – in that year, counties with a 10 percent higher investor share (over
1998-2000) experienced on average 4.3, 6.3, 4.5, and 1.5 percent lower growth
rates on average in home prices, construction employment, financial employ-
ment, and other employment. The negative association between growth rates
continues until 2012, when once again investor activity is no longer significantly
associated with differences in growth rates across counties.
Another interesting question is to what extent the variation in investor shares
is distinct from the housing supply elasticity of Saiz (2010); counties with inelas-
tic supply experienced a more pronounced boom and bust in economic activity
Mian and Sufi (2009). The answer is that they are quite distinct – the R-squared
in a population-weighted (unweighted) regression of the elasticity against the
investor share is 0.002 (0.004). The elasticity measure is available for a lower
sample of counties, so it was not included in the main analysis though the re-
sults are essentially identical when including it. As another robustness check, I
note that repeating the analysis of this paper using the vacation share from the
2000 Census instead of the investor share produces very similar results. This
helps address potential concerns about measurement error based on reported
owner-occupancy in HMDA, though as noted before, those concerns are ame-
liorated by the high correlation across years in the HMDA measure, as well as
with related variables obtained from independent datasets.
Table 2.6: Investor Activity and Boom-Bust Dynamics – Using Variation in
Investor Shares Explained by Natural Amenities
Dependent variables:
Originationsit Home Pricesit Constr. Empit Fin. Empit Other Empit
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
β2003 0.17*** 0.03 0.08 -0.00 -0.02
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
β2004 0.34*** 0.13 0.19*** 0.05 0.01
(0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
β2005 0.63*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.12** 0.06**
(0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02)
β2006 0.46*** 0.77*** 0.65*** 0.18*** 0.11***
(0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03)
β2007 -0.10 0.73*** 0.61*** 0.27*** 0.13***
(0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
β2008 -0.74*** 0.53*** 0.38*** 0.27*** 0.11***
(0.16) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
β2009 -0.52*** 0.36*** 0.17 0.20*** 0.07**
(0.17) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.03)
β2010 -0.41** 0.17 -0.05 0.23*** 0.05
(0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.08) (0.03)
β2011 -0.24 0.01 -0.14 0.26*** 0.06*
(0.19) (0.17) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04)
β2012 -0.21 0.05 -0.06 0.27*** 0.09**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04)
County, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.80 0.84 0.59 0.35 0.56
# Observations 17136 10280 17710 17952 17930
# Counties 816 514 805 816 815
The table reports estimates based on the model
Y jit  αi   τt   βtp
{Investor Sharei  τtq   φtpZi  τtq   εit
where βt is the coefficient associated with the interaction of the investor share over 1998-2000
and a year t dummy variable. {Investor Sharei denotes the fitted values from regressing the
investor shares on the physical characteristics of localities from the Natural Amenities Scale
(equation 2.2). Regressions include county fixed effects and time fixed effects for the sample
of largest counties for which data is available. Additional controls include the interaction of
year dummies with county characteristics Zi: 2000 median home values, household income,
the fraction of the population that is college-educated, poor, have an open mortgage, iden-
tify as white, are 55 years old or older, live in an urban area, and the manufacturing share of
employment in 2000 from the QCEW. Standard errors clustered at the county-level.
Table 2.7: Investor Activity and Boom-Bust Dynamics – Models in First Dif-
ferences
Dependent variables:
∆Originationsit ∆Home Pricesit ∆Constr. Empit ∆Fin. Empit ∆Other Empit
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
β2003 -0.02 -0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
β2004 0.14 -0.03 0.15*** 0.04 -0.00
(0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
β2005 0.05 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.07 0.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02)
β2006 -0.83*** 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01
(0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
β2007 -0.95*** -0.33*** -0.25*** -0.01 -0.06***
(0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02)
β2008 -0.87*** -0.39*** -0.64*** -0.14*** -0.11***
(0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02)
β2009 -0.32** -0.44*** -0.61*** -0.19*** -0.14***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02)
β2010 -0.17** -0.37*** -0.27*** -0.02 -0.05***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02)
β2011 0.00 -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.07** -0.01
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01)
β2012 -0.13* 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.00
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01)
County, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.71 0.74 0.47 0.18 0.48
# Observations 16460 9804 17052 17283 17262
# Counties 823 516 812 823 822
The table reports estimates based on the model
∆Y jit  αi   τt   βtpInvestor Sharei  τtq   φtpZi  τtq   εit
where βt is the coefficient associated with the interaction of the investor share over 1998-2000
and a year t dummy variable. The dependent variable here is in first-differences of the log
level of the dependent variable. Regressions include county fixed effects and time fixed effects
for the sample of largest counties for which data is available. Additional controls include the
interaction of year dummies with county characteristics Zi: 2000 median home values, house-
hold income, the fraction of the population that is college-educated, poor, have an open mort-
gage, identify as white, are 55 years old or older, live in an urban area, and the manufacturing
share of employment in 2000 from the QCEW. Standard errors clustered at the county-level.
2.5 Conclusion
Much of the lively debate on the origins of the housing boom has focused on the
extent to which households of different credit scores and income contributed to
the run-up in debt in the early and mid 2000s (Mian and Sufi 2009; Adelino,
Schoar, and Severino 2016; Albanesi, Giorgi, and Nosal 2017). This paper
contributes to that literature on a relatively unexplored dimension of the housing
boom – property investors, existing home-owners acquiring new property. This
paper documents that investor counties experienced higher speculation (flip
rates) in the peak boom years. They also experienced a pronounced boom-bust
cycles in mortgage originations, home prices, and construction employment.
Understanding the role played by property investors might be important for
determining the presence of a real estate bubble. From 2003-2006, when second
and third-home buying flourished, the home ownership rate barely budged from
68.3 to 68.8 percent. During this time second-home purchases contributed more
to housing debt than first-time home owners or equity extractors (Bhutta 2015).
In this light, the peak boom years are better understood as a period of second-
home buying and speculation. This paper argues that investor activity played
an important role in determining economic activity over 2003-2010. This is in
line with predictions of housing bubble models showing that relatively few op-
timists can influence economic activity (Piazzesi and Schneider 2009; Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2016; DeFusco, Nathanson, and Zwick 2017).
This paper shows that the new properties acquired were concentrated in
counties with pleasant qualities such as warm winters and waterfronts. These
counties experienced a surge in speculation and economic activity over 2003-
2006, and a collapse in the following years. Property investment could explain
about 30 percent of the variation in construction and financial employment over
2003-2010. Property investment is also associated with sizable losses in home




Migration Explain the Flow of
Capital from Developing to
Advanced Economies?
3.1 Introduction
According to the textbook neoclassical growth model, countries with faster pro-
ductivity growth should attract more foreign capital. Instead, high growth
countries tend to export capital. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) name this
puzzling correlation the Allocation Puzzle, and document that the reason is a
saving wedge – savings in high growth countries are much larger than what
the textbook neoclassical growth model predicts. There are many potential ex-
planations, including consumption habits (Carroll, Overland, and Weil 2000),
borrowing constraints for both households and firms (Sandri 2014; Coeurdacier,
Guibaud, and Jin 2015), and demographics such as a growing population of
young savers (Modigliani 1970; Chamon, Liu, and Prasad 2013). Carroll and
Jeanne (2015) suggest a different answer: countries with higher productivity
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growth might have higher uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. An open question
is what plausible microfounded household income process could deliver both
growth and net capital outflows.
This paper provides an answer by focusing on a specific type of risk – the
migration of workers from rural to urban areas within a country. Many rapidly
growing countries have urbanized quickly in the last decades. In China, for
example, the urban population grew from 20 to 52 percent between 1980 and
2012. Urbanization generates income growth, as labor relocates to the higher
productivity urban sector (Williamson 1988; Henderson 2003). However, migra-
tion also entails substantial idiosyncratic risk (Stark 1993; Jaeger et al. 2010).
One driver of income volatility is that migration in many developing countries
tends to be circular: workers move back and forth between rural and urban
areas, and so income fluctuates based on location. Reviewing several country
studies, Skeldon (2012) notes that circular migration is so prevalent “regular
short-term movement back and forth between village and town far exceed any
longer-term migration.” In China, the internal passport system hukou explicitly
encourages circular migration, by in some cases banning rural households from
permanently locating to urban centers (Hare 1999; Zhao 2005).
This paper models the saving motives of residents in a country undergoing
urbanization characterized by circular migration, using a heterogeneous agent
model with three worker types – urban, migrant, and rural. Workers move to
and fro sectors as determined by exogenous transition probabilities calibrated
to match migration flows and the pace of urbanization in China. When workers
are employed in the urban sector, they earn the higher urban wage, and save as
self-insurance against location shocks. Rural workers, on the other hand, run
down the savings they accumulated while employed in the city. As the country
urbanizes, the population shifts towards the savers, and so aggregate savings
rise. Income also grows because labor is more productive in the urban sector.
Investment also rises for the same reason, though it does not match the increase
in savings. As a result, the urbanization process results in both income growth
as well as net capital outflows.
The model predicts that, all else equal, countries with a larger increase in
the urban population (the savers) would be more likely to export capital.1 That
is indeed the case in the data. Countries with larger increases in the share of
the urban population over 1980-2000 experienced on average lower net capital
inflows relative to GDP (the correlation coefficient is 0.43).2 This may shed
light on why some fast-growing developing countries tend to export capital (e.g.
China) but others (e.g. Chile) do not. The answer suggested in this paper is
countries like Chile were already close to the steady state urban population, and
so did not recently undergo a rapid and dramatic urbanization process the way
China has. This contributes to the literature on the Allocation Puzzle. Models
focusing on the upstream flow of capital, such as Quadrini, Mendoza, and Rios-
Rull (2009); Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Angeletos and Panousi
(2011) can explain why capital flows from developing countries to advanced
economies, but are silent on the cross-country correlation between growth and
capital outflows within developing countries documented in Gourinchas and
1While the model is calibrated to match China’s urbanization process, the key feature of
the model – that urbanization is characterized by circular migration – is a feature of many
countries; see for example Lucas (1993); Collinson et al. (2006); Deshingkar and Akter (2009);
Newland (2009); Thom (2010).
2This is shown in Figure 3.5 for the sample of 68 developing countries in Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013).
Jeanne (2013).
The model also predicts a positive correlation across countries between eco-
nomic growth and capital outflows, based on productivity differences. In coun-
tries with higher urban sector productivity, urbanization leads to both iq larger
income gains from labor relocation, and iiq a larger urban-rural wage gap which
increases income volatility from location shocks and leads to larger net capi-
tal outflows. I also explore the effects of reducing frictions prohibiting migrants
from permanently relocating to the city. When those frictions are lowered, there
is less income volatility associated with worker location shocks, and so savings
decrease. This suggests that the 2014 hukou reforms in China, which relaxed
legal barriers to migration, may be part of the reason why China’s consumption
share of GDP has increased since.
This paper is most closely related to the literature arguing that precaution-
ary savings associated with economic growth explain why fast-growing develop-
ing countries tend to export capital, reviewed in Gourinchas and Rey (2013).
Carroll and Jeanne (2015) argue the “growth-to-saving puzzle can be explained
... if the bargain that countries make when they embark on a path of rapid devel-
opment involves not only a pickup in productivity growth but also an increase
in the degree of idiosyncratic risk.” This paper contributes to this literature
by focusing on risks associated with migration. Other work emphasizes other
aspects of economic growth such as financial development. In Sandri (2014)
growth accelerations cause net capital exports because credit constraints imply
entrepreneurs need to save more than they invest for precautionary motives. In
Buera and Shin (2017) economic reform leads to productivity growth and higher
savings, though investment lags because of domestic financial frictions. Simi-
larly, in Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) and Bacchetta and Benhima
(2015) external surpluses are generated by the interaction between productivity
growth and financial frictions.
3.2 Model
The economy is represented by a heterogenous agent model with aggregate
certainty. There are three ex-ante identical household types – rural, migrant,
and urban – who are subject to exogenous location shocks given by a first-order
Markov chain. Both urban and migrant workers earn the urban wage, though
migrants are much more likely to move to the rural sector. Rural workers earn
the rural wage.
3.2.1 Firms
Goods in the urban and rural sectors are produced by competitive firms with
Cobb-Douglas production functions. Total factor productivity (TFP) A` in each
sector ` is assumed to be constant, with productivity higher in the urban sector,
Au ¡ Ar. To make goods Y`ptq in sector ` at time t, urban firms employ migrant
Mptq and urban Uptq workers, while rural firms employ only rural Rptq workers.
Firms also employ capital Kuptq in the urban sector and Krptq in the rural.
Production each period is given by:
Yuptq  AuKuptq
αpMptq   Uptqq1α (3.1)
Yrptq  ArKrptq
αRptq1α (3.2)
where α P p0, 1q is elasticity of output with respect to capital. Capital in both
sectors depreciates at rate δ, and earns the world interest rate r. Output prices
in both sectors are normalized to 1. Firms maximize profit with respect to their
labor and capital demand. These assumptions, together with constant TFP in
each sector, pin down the equilibrium capital-per-worker ratio in each sector,



















Similarly, equilibrium wages are also constant, since the capital-per-worker
ratio is constant in each sector.















The economy consists of many infinitely lived individuals. In particular, there
is a continuum of agents of total mass equal to one. Each household consists of
one agent and I use the terms household, agent, or worker interchangeably.
Worker location, and thereby income, is given by an exogenous Markov
process, denoted by
P 
 puu pmu prupum pmm prm
1  puu  pum 1  pmu  pmm 1  pru  prm
 (3.7)
For example, given that a worker is currently a migrant, she remains a
migrant with probability pmm, becomes an urban worker with probability pmu,
or returns to the rural sector with probability 1  pmm  pmu. To focus only
on precautionary savings associated with circular migration, labor supply is
perfectly inelastic. There is therefore no unemployment in either of the sectors.
Households are ex-ante identical, but may differ in their asset holdings s or
their employment location `. Given values of twu, wr, r
u and initial values for











p1   rqst   wu  ct if `  U or ` M
p1   rqst   wr  ct if `  R
and st 1 P S and Upcq  c
1ρ
1ρ
, where ρ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion.3 Workers earns the urban wage wu when they are a migrant p` Mq
or urban worker p`  Uq, and the rural wage otherwise.
Let V ps, `q be the value of the objective function of a household with asset
holdings s and location `. V ps, `q is defined as the solution to the dynamic
program:
3I discretize the asset space S into 251 equally spaced assets in the grid r2, 2500s, and
use a cubic spline to interpolate between gridpoints.
V ps, `q  max
s1
Upp1   rqs  w`  s
1q   βEtrV ps1, `1q|`qs
where s1 are next period’s assets and the policy function s1  gps, `q maps
the current period’s ps, `q pair into an optimal choice of assets to carry into the
next period.
Define the unconditional distribution of ps, `q pairs, λtps, `q  Probpst 
s, `t  `q. The policy function gps, `q together with the transition matrix P for








At any given moment, aggregate wealth in the economy (S for the stock of
saving) equals the sum of individual asset holdings, where the sum is weighted







Assets can be hold domestically as capital pKptq  Kuptq Krptqq, or as net
foreign assets (NFAt), and so therefore
NFAt  St Kt
The key assumption here is that domestic and foreign assets are perfectly
substitutable because of the small country assumption that both assets pay the
world interest rate r.
3.2.3 Stationary Equilibrium
Let Ū , M̄ and R̄ denote the steady state population of consumers located in the
urban, migrant and rural locations, respectively. The steady state populations
are determined by the Markov process P .
A stationary equilibrium consists of a policy function gps, `q, a probability






 puu pmu prupum pmm prm




2. Ū   M̄   R̄  1
3. The prices pwu, wr, r
q satisfy first order conditions for firms in equations
(3.3)-(3.6).
4. The policy function gps, `q solves the household’s optimization problem as
stated in equation (3.8).
5. The probability distribution λps, `q is a stationary distribution associated











s λps, `qcps, `q where cps, `q is the
policy rule for consumption that is implied by the policy rule for next-





and S  NFA K where NFA is net foreign assets.
7. The aggregate resource constraint holds: C S  p1 rqS wupŪ M̄q 
wrR̄
3.3 Calibration
The transition probability matrix P is calibrated using data on migration flows
and the pace of urbanization in China. Six parameters need to be calibrated
between the steady state population shares of rural, urban, and migrant workers




1  M̄  R̄

P 
 puu pmu prupum pmm prm
1  puu  pum 1  pmu  pmm 1  pru  prm

H  PH
The model is calibrated using:
1. puu  0.99. Permanence in the urban sector is very high. Some leak-
ages are needed, since otherwise all households would be urban workers
in steady state. Leakages from the urban sector could occur because of
marriage, injuries, natural disasters, preference shocks, etc which can en-
courage workers to return to rural areas.
2. pur  0: Workers in the urban location cannot directly move to the rural
sector, they first have to become migrants.
3. pru  0: Workers in the rural location cannot directly move to the urban
sector, they first have to become migrants.
4. Ū  0.7: In steady state the population is largely urban. Similar values
to Ū yield the same qualitative conclusions.
5. M̄  0.1: Based on data from the official 2005 Population Sample Survey
of China, Taylor (2011) finds that 147 million Chinese are migrants, or
about 10 percent of the population. In equilibrium I set M̄ ¡ 0 due to
legal frictions in China’s registration system hukou that make it difficult
for workers to stay permanently in the city.4
6. prr  0.9727: This is chosen to match the average growth rate of the
rural population in the model with that of the World Bank’s data on
urbanization in China between 1980 and 2012. The initial values used are
Up1980q  .19, Mp1980q  0, and Rp1980q  0.81. The rural population
on average declined by 1.62 percent each year.
In sum, the transition probability matrix and steady state populations used in
the baseline calibration are:
P 
puu  .9900 pmu  .0700 pru  .0000pum  .0100 pmm  0.8755 prm  .0273
pur  .0000 pmr  .0545 prr  .9727

4Individuals with rural hukou lack access to a wide range of urban services: they cannot
enroll their children in urban public schools (or have to pay high fees to do so), and have
less access to public health care, legal assistance, the pension system, and social services
(Zhan 2005; Wing Chan and Buckingham 2008). See Zhao (2005) for a review on hukou and
temporary migration in China.
Figure 3.1: Transition to an urban economy

























 Ū  .7M̄  .1
R̄  .2

Figure 3.1 shows the simulated path of urban, rural and migrant workers, com-
pared to the actual data (from the World Bank), assuming that the number of
migrants in 1980 is zero. The economy is at first largely rural, but grows more
urban with time. Eventually it reaches its steady state distribution where 70
percent of households are urban.
Another key parameter is the size of the urban-rural wage gap. The average
gap in China was about 2.5 between 1980 and 2012 according to the National
Bureau of Statistics in China. This wage gap pins down the urban-rural TFP
ratio. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is ρ  2. The annual world interest
rate is r  .04. β  0.957 sets the steady state ratio of wealth to income to
5.7. This ratio is in line with the wealth to income ratios estimated in Piketty
and Zucman (2013) for a few advanced economies (4-6 for USA, UK, Germany
and France).
The economy’s initial conditions also need to be determined. The initial
state is taken from China’s conditions in 1980. Then, the economy was largely
rural and there was little to no migration due to legal bans prior to Deng
Xiaoping’s reforms. The rural share of the population in 1980 was 81% and the
urban 19%.
Up0q  0.19; Mp0q  0.00 Rp0q  0.81
Because of the tight controls on the rural population, I assume that at time
t  0 rural workers did not own any capital (Krp0q  0). Urban workers, on
the other hand, held the level of capital (Kup0qq consistent with the parameters









Other similar initial values, such as allowing rural workers to have the same
level of initial capital, yield the same qualitative results.
3.4 Transition to an urban economy
Starting off from a largely rural population share, the economy then advances
to its steady state where the urban share of the population is 70 percent. As the
economy urbanizes, saving increases as the population shifts towards the savers.
Income also grows because of the relocation of workers to the more productive
urban sector. The capital stock also rises, though less so than saving. As a
result, the urbanization process leads to income growth and net capital outflows.
When workers earn the higher urban wage, they have an incentive to save
to insure against the risk of returning to the low-wage rural sector. I define the
saving rate as the change in wealth implied by the optimal policy divided by
current period labor income: a
1a
w
. Figure 3.2 plots saving rates by worker type
and assets. Migrants have the highest saving rate. They earn the urban wage,
and face a 5.45 percent chance of moving to the rural sector in the next period,
where permanence is quite high (97.27 percent chance of staying there from one
period to the next). In the baseline calibration, the saving rate for migrants
ranges from 14 to 28 percent, when they are asset poor.
Urban workers have the next highest saving rates. About 20 percent of the
urban workers (those with a wealth-to-income ratio lower than 4.14) have a pos-
itive saving rate. The rest have negative saving rates, though only moderately
so. When the ratio of wealth to income drops below 4.14, urban workers begin
to save again, and as a result all urban workers have a positive stock of saving.
Rural workers, on the other hand, run down the saving they accumulated while
earning in the city. They have negative saving rates for all possible asset levels
(Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.3 plots the stationary distribution of wealth λ by worker type, that
is, for any feasible pairs ps1, `1q, λps1, `1q  Probps  s1, `  `1q. The figure
shows all urban and migrant workers have a positive stock of savings. The
stationary wealth to income ratio for the average migrant is 5.74 and 5.51 for
the average urban worker. This is the saving stock migrants then use to smooth
consumption when in the rural sector. In equilibrium, close to 20 percent of
rural workers (4 percent of total population) have fully run down their wealth
and are at the model’s borrowing constraint, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.2: Saving rates of workers















As the economy urbanizes, the population shifts towards the agents with
the higher saving rates in the model. As a result, the stock of saving grows,
as do net foreign assets. Figure 3.4 plots the time path of the total stock of
saving S, domestic capital K, and net foreign assets NFA. The net foreign
assets equal the difference between total saving and domestic capital. With
the urbanization process, all three series increase. Capital increases because
of the flow of labor into the urban sector, which is more productive. This
raises aggregate productivity and tends to raise the marginal product of capital.
Capital therefore increases to ensure the marginal product of capital is equal to
the world interest rate net of depreciation. Similarly, income rises as well.
The net foreign asset position also increases in the long-run because the
increase in the stock of saving outpaces the increase in capital. This is true long
Figure 3.3: Invariant density function of wealth


















term, but in the first periods net foreign assets slightly decrease. The reason
is that capital investment quickly rises as workers pour into the urban sector.
In contrast, it takes somewhat longer for the agents in the model to build their
stock of saving. After a few periods, however, the increase in net foreign assets
quickly outpaces that of capital. The model thus predicts that as the economy
urbanizes, income grows, as do the net foreign asset position of the country.
3.5 Applications
The model predicts that, all else equal, countries with a larger increase in the
urban population (the savers) would be more likely to export capital.5 To see
this, suppose there are two identical economies, so both have the same steady
state level of net foreign assets. Suppose one is already at (or is close to) its
5While the model is calibrated to match China’s urbanization process, the key feature of
the model – that urbanization is characterized by circular migration – is a feature of many
countries; see for example Lucas (1993); Collinson et al. (2006); Deshingkar and Akter (2009);
Newland (2009).
Figure 3.4: Aggregate wealth dynamics towards stationary equilibrium















stationary equilibrium; then by definition, neither savings nor the urban share
of the population would change (or increase much). On the other hand, an
economy with a largely rural starting point, such as the one examined in the
previous section, would be on its way to experiencing a large increase in the
urban population as well as an increase in net foreign assets.
There is some evidence in the data that countries who have urbanized the
most in recent decades have also seen larger improvements in their net foreign
asset position. Figure 3.5 plots the change in the fraction of the urban popula-
tion between 1980 and 2000 (horizontal axis) against average net capital inflows
relative to GDP, for the sample of countries in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013).
There is a negative correlation (ρ  0.43), which means that countries with
only small increases in the urban population tend to have larger net capital
inflows.
Figure 3.5: Countries with larger increases in the urban population tend to have
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Changes in the urban population share and average capital inflows between 1998 and 2000.
The sample of 68 non-OECD countries and capital inflow data are obtained from Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2013). Urban population shares obtained from the World Bank Development
Indicators.
This may shed light on why some fast-growing developing countries tend
to export capital (e.g. China) but others (e.g. Chile) do not. The answer
suggested in this paper is that countries like Chile were already close to its
steady state urban population, and so did not undergo the rapid and dramatic
urbanization process the way China did in recent decades. This contributes to
the literature on the Allocation Puzzle. Models focusing on the upstream flow
of capital, such as Quadrini, Mendoza, and Rios-Rull (2009); Caballero, Farhi,
and Gourinchas (2008); Angeletos and Panousi (2011) can explain why capital
flows from developing countries to advanced economies, but have more trouble
explaining the Allocation Puzzle within developing nations.
The model can also predict part of the cross-sectional correlation between
economic growth and capital outflows, based on differences in urban TFP (Au in
Figure 3.6: In economies with higher TFP, income and NFA grow more
























The figure plots growth in net foreign assets (y-axis) against income growth (x-
axis) in economies with different urban-rural TFP ratios Au
Ar
that are otherwise
identical. Growth is over the first 100 periods of the simulation, e.g. income
growth  Y p100q
Y p1q
 1.
equation (3.3)). This is summarized in Figure 3.7, which plots growth in coun-
tries’ net foreign assets (y-axis) in the transition towards equilibrium, against
income growth resulting from productivity gains due to urbanization (x-axis).
The model predicts that, all else equal, countries that experience faster growth
also export more capital.
The reason is that urbanization leads to higher economic growth in countries
with higher urban TFP, because of the larger gains associated with labor relo-
cation. This is shown in Figure 3.7, which plots income growth (y-axis) against
time (x-axis) in three identical economies that differ only in the level of urban
TFP.
Countries with larger TFP also experience larger increases in net foreign
Figure 3.7: Income growth, by TFP ratio



















The figure shows income growth in economies with different urban-rural TFP ra-
tions Au
Ar
that are otherwise identical. Income growth is period-to-period Y ptq
Y pt1
-1.
assets. The reason is that, all else equal, higher urban TFP generates a larger
urban-rural wage gap, thereby raising the volatility of income across locations.
Therefore, urban and migrant saving rates are higher in economies with higher
TFP. This is shown in Figure 3.8, which plots saving rates (y-axis) by worker
types and assets for two different economies, which only differ in the level of
urban TFP. As the economy urbanizes, aggregate saving increases more in the
economy where the savers have a higher saving rate.
I also examine the effects of removing barriers for the permanent relocation
of workers in the city. In particular, I compare stationary equilibria with differ-
ent values for pmu, the probability with which migrant workers become urban
workers in the next period. All else equal, higher chances of becoming an urban
worker imply lower chances of returning to the rural sector. The lower risk
Figure 3.8: Saving rates of workers, by TFP ratio
















The black curves correspond to saving rates for the baseline economy with TFP
ratio  1.85. Blue lines above are for the economy with TFP ratio  2.10
induces migrants to save less. As a result, larger pmu leads to a lower steady
state ratio of net foreign assets to income.
The motivation for this exercise is the recent relaxation of hukou legal bar-
riers to urban migration. Historically, households with rural hukou have faced
various disadvantages in the urban sector, such as difficulties buying prop-
erty, enrolling children in schools, lower access to health care, etc (Zhan 2005;
Wing Chan and Buckingham 2008). Since 2014, however, some hukou restric-
tions have been lifted.6
In the baseline calibration, pmu  .07. I now let it range from .06 to .08,
while continuing with the restrictions outlined in the baseline calibration that:
pru  pur  0, puu  0.99, M̄  .1, and prr is chosen so that the average
6See, for example: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/31/china-reform-
hukou-migrant-workers
growth rate of the rural population in the model matches that of the data, from
1980-2012. Note that since
Ū puuŪ   pmuM̄   pruR̄
Ū 0.99Ū   pmu0.1
Ū 10pmu
letting pmu range from .06 to .08 is equivalent to shifting the steady state urban
population from .6 to .8.
Lowering the barriers to urbanization reduces income volatility and so dimin-
ishes household demand for precautionary saving. As a result, the equilibrium
ratio of net foreign assets to income falls when pmu is higher. Figure 3.9 plots
the steady state ratio of net foreign assets to income (y-axis) for economies with
different pmu but who are otherwise identical. The ratio of net assets to income
falls when pmu is higher. In recent years, the consumption share of GDP in
China has risen. The model suggests a partial explanation might be the reduc-
tion in the precautionary saving motive associated with circular migration.
3.6 Conclusion
There are many explanations of why fast-growing countries tend to export capi-
tal. One of the leading explanations is that some aspect of the growth experience
leads to higher idiosyncratic uninsurable risk, which translates to high savings
and high demand for safe foreign assets. What are some of those specific risks?
And why do they matter for macroeconomics?
Figure 3.9: Lowering barriers to urbanization (higher pmu) lowers NFA/Y




















The figure plots stationary net foreign assets to income (y-axis) against pmu (x-
axis) which is the probability that a migrant becomes an urban worker in the
next period. The economies are otherwise identical.
The contribution of this paper is to provide an answer based on household
migration from rural to urban areas. Many fast-growing countries have urban-
ized quickly in recent decades. In China, for example, between 300 and 400
million people migrated to cities between 1979 and 2009 (Chan 2013). This
paper posits that risks associated with urbanization, driven by circular migra-
tion, could explain part of the reason why high growth countries tend to save
in excess of investment.
I model a heterogeneous agent economy with three worker types – rural,
migrant, and urban – who experience location shocks calibrated to match mi-
gration flows and the pace of urbanization in China. Workers in the high wage
urban sector accumulate savings as self-insurance against location shocks. As
the economy urbanizes, savings grow faster than investment, and so the coun-
try exports capital. At the same time, income grows as workers relocate to the
higher productivity urban sector. The model thus generates the within-country
stylized fact that growth episodes are accompanied by increases in saving and
net foreign assets.
The model also generates cross-sectional predictions supported in the data.
One prediction is that countries with larger increases in the share of the urban
population are more likely to be capital exporters. The model also predicts a
positive correlation between income growth (driven by urbanization) and net
capital outflows. Lastly, the model suggests that removing barriers to urban-
ization diminishes the need for saving, and could therefore partly explain why
China’s consumption share of GDP has risen recently.
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